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The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax
Compliance and Tax Simplification
Steve Johnson*
Tax compliance sometimes is thought of as purely a matter of
administration. But there are important connections between substance
and procedure.' Both affect compliance. This article explores how
simplification of the substantive tax law can improve compliance. The
particular emphasis is on how simplification can liberate human and
material resources for the IRS without which otherwise well conceived
efforts to improve compliance are likely ultimately to fail.
The landmark Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998 (RRA '98)2 is central to this. RRA '98 is part of the
problem since its excesses imposed serious new resource demands on the
IRS. Reducing those demands through moderating those excesses likely
will have to be part of the solution.
Put more fully, my thesis is this: The extent of tax compliance in the
United States is unsatisfactory. The trend line of compliance has been
downward for well over a generation, and the decline has accelerated in
recent years. Measures recently undertaken or announced by the IRS are
salutary. However, by themselves, these measures are unlikely to
reverse the decline. The likelihood is that, absent supporting changes
beyond the ability of the IRS to make on its own, these measures will do
no more than slow the rate at which American tax compliance declines.
The supporting changes to which I refer are of either of two kinds.
First, the budget of the IRS could be increased substantially and
consistently over a long period of time. The new directions charted by
the IRS could work if they are reliably supported by billions of additional

* E.L. Wiegand Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. B.A., St. Francis College; J.D., New York University. I thank Monica Miller for comments
and Shawn Patten for research assistance.
1. By "substantive" tax law, I mean those rules, which prescribe how much tax each taxpayer
owes. In "procedural" tax law, I include (i) the rules by which controversies as to the amount of
substantive liability are resolved, (ii) the rules which govern collection of the liability once its
amount has been determined, and (iii) civil and criminal penalty regimes to encourage prompt and
accurate payment of tax.
2. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112
Stat. 685 (1998) [hereinafter "RRA '98"].
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appropriations. 3 But additional, sustained budgeting on the order
required is highly unlikely, indeed borders on the politically impossible.
That being so, the other possible direction emerges as the only real
alternative to continued deterioration of tax compliance. That direction
is genuine simplification of our tax system.
Simplification would boost compliance in several ways. I will
emphasize the resources aspects. Compliance involves honest taxpayers
knowing what the law requires of them, and more "aggressive" taxpayers
being deterred by or discovered by vigilant enforcement. Simplification
that reduces IRS workloads-particularly in areas of only marginal
benefit to taxpayers or to the federal fisc-would permit redeployment of
resources that would enhance both taxpayer education and assistance on
the one hand and enforcement on the other hand. Derivatively, there will
be another benefit as well. Our system depends on self-assessment by
taxpayers. We are in danger of loss of public confidence in the tax
system, with consequent erosion of self-assessment. Many taxpayers
believe-not without justification-that other taxpayers are able to
manipulate an overly complex system to reduce their tax liabilities.
Those who believe that are tempted to adjust their own behavior in ways
adverse to compliance. By reducing actual and perceived opportunities
for cheating by others and by facilitating enforcement (through resources
redeployment) against those who do cheat, simplification can fortify the
better instincts of honest taxpayers.
But meaningful simplification is no political cake-walk. In our
history, tax simplification has been honored far more by lip service than
Still, pressures are mounting for genuine
by effective action.
simplification of our system, and the alternatives are few. Either we
substantially increase our spending on the IRS or we meaningfully
simplify tax administration. If we do neither, we will suffer continuing
loss of compliance, perhaps ultimately endangering the very viability of
the nation's revenue system.

3. Of course, I do not think more resources alone will solve all the IRS's problems. Intelligent
application of them is necessary too. Certainly, the IRS sometimes has used appropriations poorly.
For instance, one of the IRS's biggest problems is its unsatisfactory information technology. Lots of
money has been thrown at this problem over the years, and the IRS has spectacularly mismanaged it,
so much so that the IRS's requests for technology money are now reviewed quite skeptically. See,
e.g., George Guttman, OMB Cuts IRS Modernization Budget Request in Half, 97 TAx NOTES 1004,
1004 (2002) (relating the Office of Management and Budget's reduction of the IRS budget to
OMB's belief that the IRS fails to properly plan projects). Resources do not guarantee success, but
they surely are necessary to it.
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Part I of this article briefly sketches the erosion of tax compliance in
the United States. Part II demonstrates that efforts to improve
compliance ultimately depend on the availability of adequate resources.
Part III explores why resources are now and likely will continue to be
inadequate. It notes the double pinch evident recently: RRA '98 imposed
great additional demands on the IRS but Congress and administrations
have not provided the budgets to allow the IRS to meet these demands
while maintaining adequacy in other functions, including enforcement.
Part IV develops the resources links between simplification and
compliance. It offers examples of simplifications that could liberate
resources for redeployment without unduly compromising important
objectives.
The particular thrust is changes to RRA '98 rules.
Specifically, Part IV proposes changes to mitigate some of the resource
stresses created by the 1998 provisions as to offers in compromise,
spousal relief, and collection due process hearings and appeals.
Simplification has been urged ardently and eloquently, but usually
on grounds other than compliance. My hope is that this article reinforces
the movement for tax simplification by fostering realization that the
failure to effectively simplify the system means that we will have to
either pump billions more into its administration or accept revenue
erosion, unfairness, and popular discontent perhaps threatening the
viability of the system.4
I.

THE UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF TAx COMPLIANCE

The IRS frequently releases information on enforcement and
compliance. In January 1997, former IRS Commissioner Sheldon Cohen
offered these statistics: "The audit rate in 1964-68 was about 4.5 to 5%,
compliance was over 90%; today the audit rate is less than 1% and
compliance is only about 80%. Think there is a correlation? I do." 5
In absolute terms, such statistics are of limited reliability. The
enforcement figures do not always reflect the same taxes or the same
4. I hope that this assertion is not seen as melodrama. The IRS Oversight Board recently
remarked that "a private sector company that fell behind this dramatically [as the IRS has] would
find its very survival threatened." 2001 IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP. 3 [hereinafter IRS
OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP.]. Of course, the IRS is not a private sector company. The
Government's coercive power and need for revenues guarantee that there always will be a tax
system and an agency to administer it. But general discontent or evident failure could threaten either
the present system or the present agency with radical revision or replacement.
5. Sheldon S. Cohen, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 113, 117 (1997)
(citations omitted).
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types of examinations or other enforcement activities.6 Moreover, they
assign undifferentiated weights to different types of examinations that
have different intensities and results. In contrasting ways, the audit rate
figures both understate and overstate examination activity.
A.

Understatementof ExaminationActivity

The audit statistics' understatement of enforcement was noted in an
exchange of correspondence between Senator Grassley, then Chair of the
Senate Finance Committee, and then IRS Commissioner Rossotti.
Senator Grassley was concerned that "the IRS statistics don't tell the
whole story of the actual number of returns that are reviewed by the
service." 8 Specifically, "the audit numbers fail to consider millions of
IRS computer-based reviews of taxpayer returns. If these additional
millions of contacts were included, the audit rates would be three to four
times higher than reported." 9
The reference is to the IRS's information reporting program (IRP).
Under IRP, the IRS receives from third-parties millions of statements as
to amounts paid to taxpayers (such as wages, interest, and dividends)
and, to a lesser extent, amounts paid by taxpayers (such as home
mortgage interest).
Currently, the IRS computer-matches those
statements with amounts reported on taxpayers' returns. ° This omission
undercuts the comparability of IRS audit statistics across the decades:

6. In contrast to the 4.5% to 5% audit rate given by Commissioner Cohen for 1964 to 1968, a
former Treasury Assistant Secretary and leading tax academic says that the IRS audited 6% of
returns in 1965.

MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT Is, How IT GOT THAT

WAY, AND WHERE WE Go FROM HERE 93 (1999).
7. Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, to
Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Mar. 19, 2001) reprintedin Grassley
Questions Accuracy of IRS Audit Rates, 91 TAX NOTES 159, 195 (2001) [hereinafter Grassley];
Letter from Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, to Senator Charles E.
Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee (Mar. 26, 2001) reprinted in Rossotti
Responds to Grassley, 91 TAX NOTES 160, 160 (2001) [hereinafter Rossotti].
8. Grassley, supra note 7, at 159. For others advancing the same argument, see Auditing IRS
Audit Numbers Is Revealing, HOOSIER TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at F3; George Guttman, CurrentAudit
Statistics Make IRS Look Less Effective Than It Is, 90 TAX NOTES 1593, 1593 (2001); H. Wayne
Cecil, The Real Audit Rates for Individual Taxpayers, 75 TAX NOTES, 831, 831 (1997).
9. Grassley, supra note 7, at 159. In 1999, there were over 3.6 million IRP contacts with
taxpayers and millions more IRP reviews that did not result in contacts with taxpayers. Id.
10. For discussion of information reporting and matching, see IRA L. SHAFIROFF, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 3:2.1 (3d ed. 2003) (describing DIF

audits).
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[T]hese types of audit matching were done primarily by hand in the 1960s and
1970s and thus would have been included as an audit at that time. In the late
1970s, and particularly with the increased third party reporting requirements
provided for in 1986, this work was more and more performed by computers
yet was not included in the audit rate."

Commissioner Rossotti agreed that the above point is "well founded"
and that "[slimply focusing on the audit rate does substantially understate
the IRS's capacity to find errors in returns."' 12 Indeed, the Commissioner
opined:
With the use of document matching as well as other return verification
techniques that will eventually be enabled by new technology, it is my view
that there is no need to return to the levels of individual audit coverage
that
3
existed even five years ago, which was three times the FY 2000 level.'

However, the qualification described above should not lead us to
conclude that all is well. Senator Grassley acknowledged that "an IRP
'4
contact is [not] equal to a face-to-face audit on a one-for-one basis."'
He was right to do so. "[A]verage in-person audit of an individual return
results in an assessment of approximately $9,540, while the average
assessment from a document matching case is $1,506."' 15 As the IRS
Oversight Board observed: "While [audit] statistics do not recognize the
significant amount of tax return data that is compared to independent
sources such as W-2s and 1099s .... the statistics
represent a very real
16
and troubling trend in enforcement activity."'
As currently structured, information reporting and matching has
limited or no utility for many types of tax items, including income
generated through a business entity, gain or loss on sales of assets, and
most itemized deductions. This hampers the effectiveness of that
device. 17 Moreover, it raises equity concerns.

11. Grassley, supra note 7, at 159. Part of Senator Grassley's concern was that "the
understatement may be used to justify budget and staff increases" for the IRS. Id. On the other
hand, the IRS once proposed changing the definition of "audit" to include IRP cases, but "this
proposal was criticized in some parts of Congress as an attempt to inflate IRS's statistics." Rossotti,
supra note 7, at 161.
12. Rossotti, supra note 7, at 160.
13. Id.
14. Grassley, supra note 7, at 159.
15. Rossotti, supra note 7, at 161.
16. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 17.
17. See Rossotti, supra note 7, at 161 (discussing the IRS's FY 1998 estimation that personal
income that was beyond verification through document matching was about $1.2 trillion).
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It is relatively easy for the IRS to verify the returns and reported income of
taxpayers whose income results from wages, interest and dividends and who
take the standard deduction ....
It is harder, and often requires audits, to
verify the income of taxpayers with other forms of income and deductions or
more complex returns, who are often higher income taxpayers ....
To the
extent that the IRS uses more and more document matching and less and less
auditing, the effect may be perceived as, and will in fact be unfair because
higher income taxpayers will not have their returns verified to the same degree
as middle income taxpayers. 18

There may be more mileage that can be squeezed out of information
returns and matching, but the row will not be easy to plough. An
example is the IRS's recent unsuccessful attempt to electronically match
Schedules K-1 from partnerships' Forms 1065 to the returns filed by the
partners. In 2000, the IRS announced its intention to do so in a serious
manner. Leading commentators questioned the feasibility and efficacy
of such an effort.19 Others, including members of Congress, were
frustrated by slow implementation of the program. 20 In 2002, the IRS
began the matching and, by July, had sent out around 65,000 notices to
taxpayers requesting them to explain K-1 versus return discrepancies.
However, many of the discrepancies were apparent rather than real and
there were complaints about the burden imposed on small business
owners. The IRS decided to discontinue sending out such notices as of
August 2002.21 It is reported that the IRS hopes to resume the K-1
matching program but there is no certainty that it will be resumed or, if it
is, that it will be effectively implemented.22
B. Overstatement of Enforcement Activity
Not all examinations are equal. The least demanding, from the
taxpayer's standpoint, are exams performed by Service Centers. These
18. Id.
19. See Amy Hamilton, PractitionersHave 'Grave Doubts' About IRS Plansto Match K-Is, 89
TAX NOTES 1359 (2000) (discussing the Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council's concern about

the IRS's plan to electronically match).
20. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, Rossotti Says Cheating Top Concern; Houghton Plans Hearing,

95 TAx NOTES 290, 291 (2002) (discussing IRS's commissioner Rossotti and congressional
members' desire to crack down on abuses of the system before commencement of the 2003 national
audit program).
21. George Guttman, Why Did the K-1 Matching Program Go Awry?, 97 TAX NOTES 736,
736-37 (2002); Sheryl Stratton, IRS Stops Sending K-I Mismatch Notices, 96 TAX NOTES 1038,
1038 (2002).
22. Michael P. Dolan, IRS Resumes K-I Matching Program,TAX ADVISOR, April 2003, at 232.
23. Currently, the IRS likes to call them "campuses" or "compliance centers."
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are conducted by mail, typically focus on only one or a few items, and
are performed by low paid, less-trained personnel with heavy case loads
and, because of high turnover rates, limited audit experience.24 At the
other end of the spectrum are face-to-face audits performed by revenue
25
agents. Between the two are office exams conducted by tax auditors.
Although these categories are of quite different levels of rigor and
effectiveness, they are combined without weighting in IRS audit
statistics.
As an example, take Fiscal Year (FY) 1997, the year in which
Commissioner Cohen offered the statistics cited at the start of this Part
6
For that year, the IRS reported an overall audit rate of 1.09%,
1.1
derived from 1,728,122 audits of all kinds of a total of about 158,014,000
tax returns of all kinds filed. 27 Of the audits, 394,304 were done by
revenue agents; 521,116 were done by tax auditors; and 812,702 were
done by Service Center personnel.28 Thus, nearly half of the claimed
1.09% audit coverage was attributable to a type that lacks intensity,
depth, and dollar yield. In terms of their impact on compliance, Service
Center audits should be weighted at some fraction well under 1, which
would drop the reported coverage rate for that year well below one
percent.
Since FY 1997, the numbers of audits have declined and reliance on
Service Center audits has increased. For instance, for returns filed in
calendar year 2000: 168,184,400 returns were filed and 815,057 were
examined, for an official coverage rate of 0.48%. Nearly 66% of all
returns examined were looked at by compliance centers. 29 Weighting
compliance center examinations at under 1% would truly yield low
coverage.

24. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE
BUDGET, U.S. SENATE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: DIFFICULTIES IN ACCURATELY ESTIMATING TAX
EXAMINATION YIELD 27-29 (GGD-88-119) (1988) (discussing the staffing for these types of
examinations).
25. For

further

description,

see

Leandra

Lederman

& Stephen

W.

Mazza,

TAX

CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 93-96 (2d ed. 2002).

26. Cohen, supra note 5, at 117.
27.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1997 DATA BOOK 10-11, tbl. 11 (1997).

28. Id.
29. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2001 DATA BOOK 17, tbI.10 (2001)
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/oldatable.pdf [hereinafter 2001 DATA BOOK].

available at
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C. Measurementof Compliance
The taxpayer compliance rates stated by the IRS must also be taken
with a generous pinch of salt. They are estimates based on shaky
assumptions, 30 and they usually reflect excessive optimism. 3 I At least at
some times, the IRS estimates have slightly overstated actual compliance
because they failed to "take into account tax liabilities of persons who
fail to file returns at all."32 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
has remarked: "One issue ... is how to measure compliance. There is
currently no reliable measure of compliance . . . . [A] key issue in

measuring the success of the IRS is developing such a measure. In the
meantime, the IRS has extrapolated from previous studies of
noncompliance. 3 3
The foundation of the compliance figures was substantially eroded
by the abandonment of the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
(TCMP) in 1994, leaving 1988 TCMP data as the most recently
gathered. 34 TCMP audits were used to establish and confirm statistical
benchmarks to guide IRS audits, but the IRS was forced to abandon them
because of their cost and their oppressive effect on the luckless taxpayers
chosen to undergo them. 35 The result was erosion of the accuracy of the
IRS's audit selection guides, which must negatively affect enforcement
30.

See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 151 (2d ed. 2001) ("The

procedure for estimating the tax gap is an imperfect one, and even the IRS would admit that its
measures are approximations.").
31. Professor Graetz recounts a 1984 statement by then IRS Commissioner Roscoe Egger:
"[cllearly there's a trend away from compliance ....
There's definitely a continuation of the
downtrend that started 20 years ago... I think there's a belief on the part of some taxpayers that
they won't get caught ....
Even though we're talking about downtrends, you're still talking about
compliance in the 90 percentile level." Graetz properly punctures the self-congratulation (or selfdeception): "90 percent? The IRS Commissioner was putting on a happy face." GRAETZ, supra
note 6, at 90-91.
32. Michael C. Durst (reporter), REPORT OF THE SECOND INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 24 n. 16 (1988).
33. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND
RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, 5 (JCX-46-00) (2000), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-4600.pdf [hereinafter STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION].
34. For an overview of methods the IRS uses to select returns for examination, see H. Wayne
Cecil, Assuring Individual Taxpayer Compliance: Audit Rates, Selection Methods, and Electronic
Auditing, 68 CPA J. 60 (1998).
35. George Guttman, Taxpayer Compliance Measurement, British Style, 87 TAX NOTES 612,
612 (2000); see generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: STATUS OF
IRS'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP MEASURES OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE (GAO-01-535) (2001)
(noting that if compliance errors and problems were handled earlier there would be less burden on
the taxpayer).
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and compliance.36 Indeed, "[t]he last thorough tax gap study was for
1992, based on the 1988 TCMP.37 The IRS has undertaken several
initiatives to fill the information gap created by abandonment of
TCMP,38 but they have yet to produce substantial results.
D. Trends
In light of the foregoing, it would be risky to take IRS audit and
compliance statistics at face value. They do have some value, though. I
subscribe to three propositions suggested by the statistics and shared
perhaps widely by those familiar with current tax administration. 39 They
are (1) IRS enforcement has been declining; (2) taxpayer compliance has
been declining; and (3) a correlation exists between enforcement declines
and compliance declines. Moreover-and this proposition too is widely
accepted-the declines have accelerated in recent years, especially since
the mid-1990s. 40
1. Enforcement Activity
There are three main components of tax enforcement: (i)
examination and assessment, whereby liability for underreported tax is
established, (ii) collection of such liability, and (iii) in the most egregious
cases, criminal prosecution, whose object is not direct realization of
additional revenue but deterrence of future underreporting and
underpayment. All three have declined in recent years, often sharply.
Examination: Here's what happened between 1996 and 2000.
Correspondence audits of individual returns reporting under $100,000 in
36. This is a possible additional result. "Without the knowledge provided by the TCMP, IRS
audits will become less targeted and, therefore, more taxpayers who are in compliance with the tax
laws will come under IRS scrutiny." Thus, ironically, elimination-effected in order to reduce
burdens on taxpayers-"may have actually increased IRS intrusiveness in the long run." Martin A.
Sullivan, Is Taxpayer Cheating Up or Down? Nobody Knows, 75 TAx NOTES 1177, 1178 (1997).
37. SLEMROD & BAKUA, supra note 30, at 151.
38. The most recent is the National Research Program, announced in Fall 2002. See infra text
accompanying notes 110-12.
39. Earlier important studies addressing these topics included INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: A
REPORT OF THE ABA TAX SEC. INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE
(Phillip Sawicki ed., 1983), and Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The
Changing Face of Tax Enforcement 1978-1988,43 TAX LAW. 893 (1990).
40. "From fiscal 1996 to fiscal 2001-that is, the period immediately before and the years

during the IRS reform effort-the number of face-to-face audits declined 72 percent, correspondence
audits declined 56 percent, liens declined 43 percent, levies 86 percent, and seizures by 98 percent."
Amy Hamilton, IRS's Budget Tightrope Turns Into Noose, 97 TAX NOTES 1263, 1263 (2002).
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income dropped from 1,260,145 to 395,200, and face-to-face audits of
such returns dropped from 470,487 to 122,497. 4' Correspondence audits
of individual returns reporting income over $100,000 fell from 84,008 to
44,393, and face-to-face audits of such returns fell from 125,253 to
54,932.42 Audits of income tax returns of corporations with under
$5,000,000 in assets decreased from 47,836 to 16,566. 4 ' Audits of such
returns of corporations with over $5,000,000 in assets decreased from
16,508 to 11,221.44
Such declines are all the more striking because the numbers of
returns filed have substantially risen. Rising returns and falling audits
mean real deterioration in examination coverage. For example, taking a
broader time frame,
[flrom 1988 and 2000, the total number of tax returns filed increased by 18
percent (from 140.33 to 165.77 million). During the same time period the
number of tax returns examined decreased by 60 percent (from 1.77 million to
715,915) .... Taking both statistics into account, the number of tax returns
examined went from one out of every 79 in 1988 to one out of every 232 in
2000.45

The numbers are striking. IRS officials sometimes attempt to put a
good face on the situation. Other times, their exasperation bubbles to the
surface.4 6 One is not left with the feeling, either empirically or
impressionistically, that the IRS is confident that its enforcement efforts
are at a satisfactory level.
Collection: RRA '98 affected all major phases of tax administration,
but collection more than any other-both by requiring diversion of
personnel and by imposing new limitations on collection.
The
immediate results were dramatic. Comparing FY 1998 to FY 1999
(when the 1998 Act changes became effective), liens filed by the IRS
dropped from 382,755 to 167,867; levies made by the IRS plummeted
from 2,503,409 to 504,403; and seizures effected by the IRS fell from
41. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP., supra note 4, at tbl.2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 17. As noted in Part L.A, these statistics do not reflect IRP information matching
efforts. Nonetheless, "the statistics represent a very real and troubling trend enforcement activity."
Id.
46. At one point, referring to the IRS's audit presence, the commissioner of the IRS's Small
Business/Self-Employed Division exclaimed: "We are almost nonexistent anymore!"
Amy
Hamilton, Has the IRS Found a Way To Detect Unreported Income?, 95 TAx NOTES 1151, 1151
(2002) (quoting Joseph Kehoe).
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2307 to 161.47 Revenue collected as a result of IRS compliance activities
dropped by $5 billion between FY 1996 and FY 2000.48
There has been some rebound since. Nonetheless, all these
collection categories registered large declines over a six-year period.
Comparing 1996 to 2001, liens filed decreased from 750,225 to 428,376;
levies served decreased from 3,108,926 to 447,201; and seizures made
decreased from 10,449 to 255. 49
Criminal enforcement: Criminal tax prosecutions have never been
particularly numerous. Nonetheless, they can contribute to compliance if
they are well publicized and enter the public consciousness-as
happened in Leona Helmsley's case for instance. 5°
For several decades, though, the criminal enforcement function was
off track, losing its original focus on "pure" tax crimes and becoming
instead a handmaiden of the "war on drugs" and other non-tax criminal
purposes.5' The Webster Report in 1999 urged correction.52 Although
some movement has been made in that direction, more remains to be
done. The Criminal Investigation Division is still suffering effects from
years of budgetary insufficiency, organizational confusion, and mission
drift. The number of criminal tax prosecutions declined between the
years 1987 and 2000. 53
Efforts have been made to improve the criminal investigation
presence, but the sailing has been anything but smooth. Between 1995
and 2000, the number of Criminal Investigation special agents dropped
from 1300 to 700. 54 The IRS planned to turn that around by hiring 280
47. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 45.
48. See Amy Hamilton, Money Collected Through IRS Compliance Efforts Down $5 Billion, 92
TAX NOTES 17, 17 (2002) (reporting information developed by Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration).
49.

IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP., supra note 4, at tbl.2.

50. For discussion of criminal tax enforcement trends, see George Guttman, The Future Role of
IRS Criminal Investigation, 82 TAX NOTES 591, 591 (1999).
5 1. The most recent IRS annual report refers to 3284 criminal tax investigations initiated. Of
them, 1020 involved legal source tax crimes; 1313 involved illegal source financial crimes; and 951
involved narcotics-related financial crimes. 2001 DATA BOOK, supra note 29, at tbl.8.
52. WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, IRS, PUB. No. 3388, REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE'S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION 2-8 (1999).
53. As revealed by information from federal courts compiled by Transactional Records Access

Clearinghouse (TRAC), which is located at Syracuse University. See Total Tax Prosecutions
According to U.S. Courts, Fiscal Year 1981-2001, at http://trac.syr.edultracirs/findings/national/
aousc.html (compiling data from the federal courts on the number of criminal tax prosecutions).
TRAC statistics are widely cited, but sometimes have been challenged.

See, e.g., Amy Hamilton,

IRS Figures Showing Less Prosecution of Tax Cheats, 99 TAX NOTES 311 (2003).
54. See Heather Bennett, CI Compliance Rate Not Ideal, but Improving, IRS Official Says, 95
TAX NOTES 1150, 1150 (2002) (noting a decrease of 583 agents); Christopher Bergin, CID to

1024

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

special agents in FY 2001, 288 in FY 2002, and another 288 in FY
2003.55 However, many IRS and Treasury agents were diverted to antiterrorism efforts after the September 11 attacks and in connection with
the Salt Lake City Olympics. 56
So far, increases in Criminal
Investigation Division personnel have occurred but at somewhat less
than the planned numbers. 58 The Division remains "shortchanged on
personnel in a serious way.
2. Compliance
Noncompliance, as measured by estimates of taxes underpaid, also
has been increasing. Based on information from the 1988 TCMP project,
the IRS estimated that individual and corporate income tax
noncompliance cost the federal fisc over $128 billion in 1992, which was
equal to approximately 18% of actual tax liability.59 By 1998, the
estimate was raised to $195 billion. 6° Others have estimated the revenue
loss at least $300 billion.6'
Although such overall estimations are necessarily imprecise, the
impression they leave is compatible with taxpayer values as revealed by
recent surveys:
- In response to the question "How much, if any, do you think is an
acceptable amount to cheat on your income taxes?", the percentage
saying "Not at all" dropped from 87% in 1999 to 76% in 2001.62 Thus,
nearly a quarter of respondents thought that cheating of some degree is
acceptable or might be acceptable. And, of course, a larger percentage
might actually think so (and act so) than are inclined to acknowledge it to
a survey-taker.

Employment Tax Evaders: "We Will Catch You," 91 TAX NOTES 1220, 1221 (2001) (noting a loss
of 700 CID special agents).
55. Bergin, supra note 54, at 1221.
56. Bennett, supranote 54, at 1150.
57. The number of special agents grew to 2820 in FY 2001 from 2746 in FY 2000. 2001 DATA
BOOK, supra note 29, at 33, tbl.3 1.This is an increase of 74, not the 280 planned.
58. Chuck Gnaedinger, Senate Banking Panel Looks at IRS Funding, 97 TAX NOTES 190, 190
(2002) (quoting Senator Paul Sarbanes).
59. SLEMROD & BAKUA, supranote 30, at 151 (citing estimate by the IRS Research Division).
60. Amy Hamilton, The Tax Gap Game and Inklings of a Focus on Noncompliance, 79 TAX
NOTES 933, 933 (1998) (citing then IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti).
61.
62.

DONALD L. BARTLETr & JAMES B. STEELE, THE GREAT AMERICAN TAX DODGE 3 (2000).
IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP., supra note 4, at tbl. 4.

2003]

TAX COMPLIANCE

1025

* In 2001, 42% responded "Yes, more likely" to the question "Do
you think it is more likely that people 63will not report and pay their fair
amount of taxes now than in the past?".
* In 2001, 9% responded "Yes, more inclined" to the question "Are
you more inclined to take a chance of being audited now than you were
in the past?". 64
One should not attach excessive weight to these survey results, but
they should command some attention.
The tax gap numbers are
moving up, and the survey numbers of return honesty are moving down.
Neither set is copper-bottomed, but their conjunction tends to suggest
declining tax compliance in the United States. There is widespread
impressionistic evidence to the same effect. 66
3. Connection Between Enforcement and Compliance
Some taxpayers are so honest that they will file accurate returns (or
returns they genuinely believe to be accurate) even when they know
there is little or no chance their returns will be examined by the IRS. But
a large number of taxpayers have greater moral flexibility. For them, the
degree to which their returns are "aggressive" depends very much on
their calculus of risk and reward. The size of potential tax savings is
factored against the likelihood of audit and the possible magnitude of
resultant deficiencies, interest, and penalties.6 7
The existence of this phenomenon is well known although its
magnitude is unclear. A public employees group has estimated that 15%
to 20% of citizens negligently or willfully refuse to comply with the
internal revenue laws. The true figure is unlikely to be much less and
may be more.

63. Id. Question 3 (32% said "No, not" and 26% said "Don't know").
64. Id. Question 5 (76% said "No, not" and 15% said "Don't know").
65. The Oversight Board was "reluctant to assign too much importance to a single survey," but
it did note "a possible negative change in attitude on cheating on taxes." The Board intends to repeat
the survey. It concluded: "There is cause for alarm if this trend continues." Id. at 13.
66. The impressions are those of IRS officials and private sector practitioners alike. ThenCommissioner Rossotti said that cracking down on tax abuse will be the "biggest problem his
successor will have," Hamilton, supra note 20, at 290, and "[s]ome say tax professionals can no
longer convince clients to fear the IRS .. " Id. (quoting Rep. Amo Houghton).
67. See, e.g., George R. Goodman, Tax Return Compliance, 76 TAx NOTES 1201, 1201 (1997)
(discussing Rossatti's interchange with Congress).
68. 144 CONG. REC. S4452, S4458 (daily ed. May 7, 1998) (statement of Senior Executives
Association).
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Whatever its precise quantification, however, the fact that a sizeable
number of taxpayers are driven by the risk/reward calculus strongly
argues that enforcement and compliance are correlated, as former
Commissioner Cohen maintained. 69 The declining IRS examination rates
are well publicized in the popular media, 70 and they typically are not
accompanied by the caveat as to IRP matching we noted previously.7'
With that decline being noticed by risk/reward calculating taxpayers,
72
declining enforcement will mean dechninf compliance.
The most recent IRS Commissioner, many other past and present
IRS officials, 74 academics, 75 and others (including private sector taxpayer

representatives) 76 all have warned of declining compliance. The most
recent information on the relationship between enforcement and
compliance comes from two studies-the Indirect Effects Study and the
Consensus Judgment Study-conducted by the IRS Office of Research.
They suggest that a one percentage point increase in the audit rate has the
potential to produce over $50 billion in additional revenue.7 7 The bulk of
this would come from indirect effects (the ripple effects of audit and
other activities), such as "deterrence, changed public perceptions,
69. See supra text accompanying note 5.
70. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, IRS Audits at Record Low Officials Cite Decade-Long Staff
Decrease, Old Computers, Law Defending Taxpayers, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 2001, at IA. A 1988
report noted "widespread media attention to low rates of audit coverage, a form of publicity which
almost certainly discourages compliance." Durst, supra note 32, at 47 n.45.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 7-17.
72. This is especially so since much non-compliance today involves types of income that are
highly manipulable, i.e., types of income not covered by information reporting. See supra text
accompanying note 18.
73. See, e.g., Patti Mohr, Compliance Problems Top Priority, Rossotti Says, 91 TAX NOTES
206, 206 (2001) (discussing Rosotti's testimony before Congress).
74. These officials include former Commissioners Cohen and Alexander. Cohen, supra note 5,
at 117; Donald C. Alexander, IRS Reform and Its Impact on the Tax System, in THE FUTURE OF
AMERiCAN TAXATION 7 (Joseph J. Thorndike ed., 2002). See also Bennett, supra note 54, at 1150
(quoting Mark E. Matthews, recent former chief of the IRS Criminal Investigation Divison, as
stating "[nlo one at the IRS will argue we're where we want to be with compliance").
75. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 6, at ch.6 (discussing the proliferation of tax avoidance);
SLEMROD & BAKLIA, supra note 30, at ch.5 (encouraging simplification of the system and
enforcement of its provisions in order to promote taxpayer compliance).
76. Declining compliance feeds on itself. For instance, corporate tax shelters are a major
problem. See Owen Ullman, Treasury to Target Corporate Tax Abuses, USA TODAY, Feb. 29,
2000, at IA (quoting then-Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers as saying that this phenomenon
"may be the most serious compliance issue threatening the American tax system today," and quoting
Paul Sax, then chair of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation, as saying "[w]hen
individuals learn what corporations in America are doing, they'll go home and invent their own
private shelters").
77. See Herman Ayayo, Thomas F. Field & Joe Thorndike, NTA Conferees Mull Future Tax
Cuts, IRS Compliance Efforts, 97 TAX NOTES 1012, 1014 (2002) (reporting remarks of Alan
Plumley of the Office of Research, at the annual meeting of the National Tax Association).

2003]

TAx COMPLIANCE

1027

education, and changed attitudes., 78 According to the studies, "[t]he
indirect effects of audits are estimated to be 11 times as large as the
direct effects., 79 Audits, information matching, criminal convictions,
mailing nonfiler notices, and return preparation assistance all were found
to have a statistically significant impact on taxpayer compliance.8 °
While caution always is appropriate in considering estimates such as
these, 8' the recent studies contribute further evidence of the connection
between enforcement and compliance.

II.

THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Self-reporting-so called "voluntary assessment"82-is the bedrock
of our system of taxation. 83 Unlike as in some other revenue systems, 84
taxpayers here make the first determination of their liabilities via the
returns they prepare and file. Moreover, given the low audit rates, 85 that
first determination typically is the only determination.
That being the case, it is central to the health of our revenue system
that the returns filed by taxpayers be at least reasonably accurate. 86
There are two means to promote such accuracy: the velvet glove of
education and assistance on the one hand and the iron fist of enforcement
on the other. To function well, our system needs both, just as a bird
needs two wings to fly. Additional resources are needed for both to
operate effectively.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Offsetting refunds for outstanding debts and telephone responses to taxpayer service
requests were not found to have statistically significant effects. Id.
81. See, e.g., Durst, supra note 32, at 13-16 (cautioning against excessive reliance on revenue
yield projections since "immediate revenue yield constitutes only a partial measure of the success of
a tax administration system").
82. The term is a misnomer, of course. No system that is backed by as extensive an array of
civil and criminal sanctions as are found in the Internal Revenue Code is "voluntary."
83. Treas. Reg. § 601.103(a) (2002); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983); Flora
v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
84. For instance, in Japan and the United Kingdom, most taxpayers do not have to file income
tax returns because those countries' withholding systems are both more precise and more extensive
than ours. SLEMROD & BAKUA, supra note 30, at 142. But see id. at 310 n.28 (the United Kingdom
is moving towards requiring more returns). For a proposal that the United States should
substantially decrease required returns by adjusting its withholding regimes, see Joseph A. Snoe, Tax
Simplification and Fairness: Four Proposalsfor Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 ALB. L. REV. 61,
111-15 (1996).
85. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
86. As an indication of this importance, "98 percent of the revenues collected [by the IRS for
FY 2001] were paid without active IRS intervention." 2001 DATA BOOK, supra note 29, at 2.
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Education and Assistance

RRA '98 was partly the cause and partly the effect of a larger
process of redirecting the IRS. In the past, I have criticized aspects of
RRA '98 and of the process that led to it, 87 and I criticize other aspects in

this article. 88 But the picture is not entirely gloomy; some aspects of
RRA '98 and the process have been wholesome. One of them is
attitudinal. Before the process, IRS agents too often held an attitude
towards taxpayers resembling "I know you're cheating.

I'm going to

prove it, or at least resolve all doubts against you. '89 That attitude was
poisonous and, understandably, alienated honest taxpayers. It has been
observed that
by far the most important element of the Service's efforts to increase respect
for the tax system is ... [creating] an organizational "culture" of cooperation
with the public. To be effective, these efforts should pervade every respect of
the Service's activities, especially those in which Service personnel come into
contact with the public. Those taxpayers who make honest efforts to comply
with the tax laws are equivalent
to a business' valued customers, and they
90
should be treated accordingly.

A major thrust of the reform process was dislodging this attitude, 9'
and considerable progress has been made. Part of the redirection has

87. See generally Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and
Realities of the New Tax Burden-of-ProofRules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413 (1999) (criticizing RRA '98
provision codified as I.R.C. § 7491); Steve R. Johnson, The Proposed Tax Advisor-Client Privilege:
An Idea Whose Time Should Never Come, 78 TAX NOTES 1041, 1041 (1998) (criticizing RRA '98
provision codified as I.R.C. § 7525).
88. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
89. "The IRS has been [a]closed organization for many years, with many of its employees
having little or no professional experience outside of the [Slervice.
This can lead to
misunderstandings, suspicion and a them-against-us attitude toward taxpayers." Hearingon the IRS
Before the Subcomm. on Government Management, Information and Technology of the House
Comm. on Government Reform on Oversight, 1998 WL 186711, 48 106th Cong. (1998) (statement
of Michael Marcs of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) [hereinafter 1998
Oversight Hearings].
90. Durst, supra note 32, at 48. Indeed, "[t]he view of the honest taxpayer as a valued
customer has served as a centerpiece of efforts to improve tax compliance at the state level." Id.
n.48.
91. Emblematic of the change is the change of the IRS's mission statement. Section 1002 of
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reformation Act of 1998 directed the IRS to review
and restate its mission in order to emphasize serving the public and meeting taxpayer needs. RRA
'98, supra note 2, at § 1002. The IRS announced its revised mission statement in September 1998.
It is: "Provide America's taxpayers with top quality service by helping them to understand and meet
their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all." IRS
OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 2. Previously, the mission statement had focused on
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been renewed emphasis by the IRS on its taxpayer education and
assistance efforts.92
The IRS's taxpayer service and education efforts are multiple. They
include: (i) providing general information as to tax preparation and
planning, (ii) creating and maintaining liaisons with tax preparers and
advisers, (iii) answering specific taxpayer inquiries in aid of their return
filing, and (iv) responding to taxpayers in resolving questions as to their
accounts for past years.
If performed well, such efforts "may strongly affect the public's
commitment to tax compliance. 93 This is so for several reasons. First,
specific errors can be prevented, both immediately and, as a result of
enhanced taxpayer and advisor knowledge, in the future. Second, an
atmosphere of cooperation can be created, leading to greater public
satisfaction with, and so support for, the tax system. 94 Third, "a carefully
monitored program of taxpayer assistance within the agency provides an
effective means to identify patterns of problems and misunderstandings
early in the process and to correct them before they become
widespread."95
When poorly done, however, "the entire enterprise [of taxpayer
assistance] can be counterproductive., 96 Taxpayer frustration at being
unable to reach responsive officials and taxpayer anger at being given
wrong information can alienate them from the system, decreasing
compliance.
Unfortunately, the IRS historically has not performed taxpayer
service particularly well. Stories are legion of taxpayers getting only
busy signals when calling IRS Taxpayer Assistance or of being given
inaccurate information if they do get through. Inadequate budgetary
support has been a main reason.97 This led to inadequate facilities, high
personnel turnover, and less than optimal training.9 It also has led to
collecting the proper amount of tax at the least cost, continual improvement of products and services,
and achieving public confidence through integrity, efficiency, and fairness. 1998-15 I.R.B. 837.
92. "Since I became commissioner, I have tried to make clear my priorities for the IRS [to put]
far more emphasis on trying to see things from the point of view of the taxpayers and emphasizing
service and fairness to taxpayers." 1998 Oversight Hearings, supra note 89, at *4 (statement of
Charles Rossotti).
93. Durst, supra note 32, at 14.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Kent W. Smith & Kary A. Kinsey, Cooperation and Control: Strategies and Tactics for
Tax Examination, 1 TAX ADMIN. REV. 13, 21 (1985).
96. Durst, supra note 32, at 45.
97. Id.at 6, 11.
98. Id. at 11, 44.
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technology gaps as a result of which relevant account information cannot
be assessed.99 The consequent frustrations are all the greater for
taxpayers increasingly accustomed to efficient service when they deal
with private sector entities.'0°
Improving taxpayer assistance was an important objective beginning
in the mid-1990s. Early on, the efforts were fitful and of limited
effect.' 0 ' The IRS is claiming greater success now. It "estimates that
71.5 percent of taxpayers who call the IRS get through"' 1 2 and that the
advice they receive from the IRS assisters is 75.21 percent accurate.'0 3
In FY 2001i the IRS says it offered advice to taxpayers nearly
120,000,000 times, taking telephone, teletax, unsolicited correspondence,
and walk-in contacts.1t 4
However, the increased emphasis on taxpayer assistance has been at
the expense of enforcement. From FY 2000 to FY 2001, the number of
IRS customer service representatives rose substantially, from 13,339 to
officers, tax
15,211. In contrast, the ranks of revenue agents, 0revenue
5
thinned.1
all
officers
appeals
and
auditors, attorneys,
Yet, even such predation has not been enough to fully staff taxpayer
service efforts. The IRS estimates that, to reach its goals, it will need
about 2300 more telephone assisters (which would cost about $115
million) and about 3000 more staff for walk-in assistance offices (which
would cost about $200 million). Thus, additional resources will be
needed for the first of the two pillars of compliance: IRS taxpayer and
education. As we are about to see, the same is true of the second pillar:
enforcement.

99. Id. at 42 ("the detrimental effect of the Service's inability to provide prompt account
information almost certainly has been severe").
100. Id. at 6.
101. See, e.g., George Guttman, Lack of Resources Is Showing Up in IRS Performance
Measures, 87 TAx NOTES 1577, 1577 (2002); Barton Massey & Sheryl Stratton, IRS Struggles with
New Customer Service Role, 83 TAx NOTES 1542, 1542 (1999).
102. George Guttman, What Would an Adequately Funded IRS Look Like?, 97 TAx NOTES 36,
37 (2002). The IRS's goal is 87.5%. Private sector companies have rates in the high 90%s. Id.
103. 2001 DATA BOOK, supra note 29, at 25, tbl.23.
104. Id.
105. Revenue agents: from 12,828 to 12,371; revenue officers: from 6028 to 5879; tax auditors:
from 1698 to 1213; attorneys: from 1484 to 1432; appeals officers: from 1006 to 975. Id. at 33,
tbl.31.
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B. Enforcement
Every worthwhile project of life, be it individual or collective,
depends for its success on two ingredients: direction (a sound plan or
idea) and energy (in our context, resources). Insofar as IRS enforcement
is concerned, I am highly optimistic that the direction component is in
place or soon will be-the IRS recently has announced enforcement
strategies that hold genuine promise.
However, direction without energy achieves little. The recently
announced strategies will fulfill their promise only if they are backed
with adequate resources. Moreover, little will be accomplished on
balance if resources allocated to the new strategies are withdrawn from
other priority areas.
1. New Directions
Other changes have been made as well, 1° 6 but I want to identify four
major changes: (i) the National Research Program, (ii) the "highnoncompliance areas" audit focus, (iii) offshore-accounts enforcement,
and (iv) the attack on corporate tax shelters.
National Research Program (NRP): In late Fall 2002, the IRS
inaugurated a new sampling project to improve its methods of targeting
returns for examination. ° 7 NRP will take the place of the previously
abandoned Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program. 0 8 Less than
50,000 individual returns will be included1 ° 9 Of these, around 2000
returns involve comprehensive
face-to-face audit involving every line
hO
item on the return.
Another 30,000 involve in-person, although more
limited, audit."' Another 9000 involve correspondence audit of selected
items.112 The remaining 8000 returns involve only information matching

106. For instance, in late 2002, the IRS Large & Midsize Business Division introduced a revised
audit process. See Amy Hamilton, IRS To Roll Out Revamped Audit Process in December, 97 TAX
NOTEs 623, 623 (2002) (discussing the altered audit process).
107. News Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Moves to Ensure Fairness of Tax System;
Research Program Works to Increase Compliance Program Effectiveness, Reduce Burdens on
Taxpayers (Jan. 16, 2002) (on file with Westlaw, 2002 WL 74410) [hereinafter IRS Moves to Ensure
Fairness]; News Release, Internal Revenue Service, What Is NRP? (Jan. 2002) (on file with
Westlaw, 2002 WL 74409).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
109. IRS Moves to Ensure Fairness, supra note 107.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
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without taxpayer contact. 1 3 Returns are selected across income and
demographic lines. The goal of NRP is to provide data profiles in order
to refine IRS statistical techniques in order to better target future
examinations.' 4
"High-noncompliance areas" audit focus: The tax and popular press
have been replete in recent years with reports of "high end" tax
evasion. 15 High-end evasion is significant in itself because of the
amount of revenue involved. Perhaps even more importantly, the
perception that the rich are paying less tax than the law commands can
erode compliance throughout the income spectrum. 16
In Fall 2002, the IRS announced that it was revising its audit
emphases and allocation of audit resources to address this problem. 117
The focus will be on (i) offshore credit card users, (ii) high-income
taxpayers likely to have underreported income, (iii) abusive schemes,
including abusive shelters, trusts, and scams, (iv) high-income nonfilers,
and (v) unreported income. 1 8 As part of the effort, the IRS will use a
new tool: the Unreported Income Discriminant Index Formula. 19
Of course, the IRS has engaged in some enforcement in these areas
for years, which has borne some fruit, including recently. 120 The
113. Id.
114. For discussion of NRP, see George Guttman, IRS National Research Program on Track
Despite Training Delays, 97 TAx NOTES 331, 331 (2002); Amy Hamilton, IRS Set To Begin Random
Audits of Taxpayers, 97 TAX NOTES 617, 617 (2002); William Stevenson, Taxpayer Rights and
Minimizing AdversarialNature of NRP Audits, 96 TAX NOTES 1773, 1773 (2002).
115. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 20, at 290; David Cay Johnston, Affluent Avoid Scrutiny on
Taxes Even as I.R.S. Warns of Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Late Edition, Apr. 7, 2002, sec. 1, at 1.
116. As a prominent tax attorney and now Treasury official put it,
[t]he belief that the tax laws bestow on certain taxpayers opportunities to minimize their
taxes has a corrosive effect on the tax system because taxpayers come to see the laws as
unfair ....
This is a serious concern because research by social scientists suggests that,
when it comes to complying with the law, the belief that the laws are legitimate and
ought to be complied with has a stronger motivating effect than the fear of being caught.
Pamela F. Olson, Predictions,20 A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX. NEWSL. 4-5 (Winter 2001); see also Durst,
supra note 32, at 13.
117. News Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Sets New Audit Priorities (Sept. 2002) (on
file with Westlaw, 2002 WL 31053874).
118. Id.
119. For details, see New Audit Strategy Focuses on 'High Risk' Noncompliance Areas, 97 J.
TAX'N 195, 195 (2002).

120. For instance, in November 2002, the IRS and the Department of Justice announced
indictments of three individuals in connection with Tower Executive Resources. They set up shell
corporations for small business owners that were used to conceal nearly $9,000,000 in taxable
income in secret accounts in the Turks & Caicos Islands and other countries. The indictments follow
the June 2002 conviction of another person in connection with the Tower scheme. Press Release,
Dept. of Justice, Indictment of Promotors of Alleged Illegal Offshore Tax Evasion Scheme (Nov. 5,
2002) available at http://www.usdoj.gov.
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heightened emphasis under the new initiative is welcome nonetheless.
High-end tax evasion is exceedingly corrosive of popular confidence in
the tax system,' 2 1 thus of voluntary compliance.
Offshore accounts enforcement: I mentioned this above as part of the
new audit focus. Yet enforcement in this area has involved other actions
as well. Although the magnitude of the problem is murky,122 there is
little doubt that substantial numbers of Americans are concealing from
the IRS large amounts of taxable income through use of offshore bank,
credit card, and other accounts. 23 The IRS has issued summonses to
obtain information on taxpayers who use offshore credit cards to evade
United States taxes. In October 2002, it announced that it had petitioned
several federal district courts to obtain approval to serve additional John
24
Doe summonses1 on over 70 companies. 25
In mid-January 2003, the IRS announced a type of amnesty to
encourage taxpayers who used this device to come forward. If they did
so by April 15, 2003, they would pay tax on the previously unreported
income plus pay interest and civil penalties. 126 However, they will
not
27
suffer criminal prosecution or imposition of the civil fraud penalty.
Corporate tax shelters: Individual tax shelters were a major blight on
our tax system between the 1960s and the 1980s; corporate tax shelters
are now.' 28 The revenue and compliance effects of corporate shelters
have been a key item in popular, political, and professional tax

121. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation-Then and Now, 74 TAX NOTES 903,
907 (1997) (identifying the belief that the rich can escape the income tax with the help of clever
lawyers and accountants as a reason for loss of public support for the income tax).
122. Bank secrecy laws in over two dozen tax-haven countries have enabled Americans to hide
large incomes while lavishly living through use of the foreign accounts and credit cards. The
Government initially estimated that a million American taxpayers have undisclosed credit cards from
offshore banks. It now thinks the number is somewhat smaller. Leigh Strope, IRS Offers Some Tax
Evaders Leniency, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at C2.

123. For examples of the schemes and their level of organization, see Amy Hamilton, A Glimpse
Inside Offshore Greed, 98 TAX NOTES 297, 297 (2003).
124. Sheryl Stratton, DisclosureInitiative Sought for Offshore Credit Card Crackdown, 97 TAX

NOTES 745, 745 (2002). For rules governing enforcement of such summonses, see I.R.C. § 7609(f).
125. Heather Bennett, IRS Seeks 'Limited' Informationfrom Companies to Identify Cheats, 97
TAX NOTES 327, 327 (2002).
126. Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-4 I.R.B. 311.
127. Id.; see Amy Hamilton, IRS Offers Amnesty to Taxpayers Hidinncome Offshore, 98 TAX

NOTES 296, 296 (2003) ("Avoidance of criminal prosecution is not fhe of the promises of partial
amnesty, but it is a possibility.").
128. For comparison of individual and corporate shelters through the lens of at-risk concepts, see
James Whitmire & Bruce Lemons, Putting Tax Shelters at Risk-Discussion and Proposalfor
Change, 98 TAX NOTES 585, 585 (2003).
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discussions for about half a decade now. 129 "The Clinton Administration
insisted that the greatest threat to the income tax is from corporate tax
shelters." 130
Attacks on corporate tax shelters have involved legislation,
regulations, other administrative pronouncements, and litigation.13 ' Then
IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams in a recent speech 132 "indicated
that the Internal Revenue Service had essentially declared war on abusive
tax avoidance transactions .... [T]his war would progress on three main
fronts (enhanced disclosure and registration requirements, more frequent
and expeditious published guidance on questionable transactions, and an
increased focus on enforcement) . . . ,13 A recent clash in this war has
received great attention. In July 2002, the Department of Justice filed
summons enforcement actions against two national accounting firms
(KPMG and BDO Seidman) 134 in connection with IRS investigations of
tax-shelter promotions by the firms. 135 The firms resisted on privilege

129. One of the earlier pieces was Diana B. Henriques, 10 Years After Tax Overhaul, the
Loopholes Expand, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1996, at sec. 4, p. 3. Subsequent articles increasing the
visibility of the problem included: Joseph Bankman, The New Market in CorporateTax Shelters, 83
TAX NOTES 1775, 1775 (1999); Martin A. Sullivan, Shelter Fallout? CorporateTaxes down, Profits
up, 84 TAX NOTES 653, 653 (1999); Janet Novack & Laura Sanders, The Hustling of X Rated
Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 14, 1998, at 198.
130. Michael J. Graetz, 2001 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax
Counsel: Erwin Griswold's Tax Law-and Ours, 56 TAX LAW. 173, 180 (2002).
131. For a discussion of some of them, see Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner'sPerspective
on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactionsand in Tax Shelters,
54 SMU L. REV. 47, 47-72 (2001) (discussing corporate tax shelters generally); Daniel N. Shaviro,
Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 221-44
(2000) (discussing cross-border dividend-stripping and economic substance); Lee Sheppard, Slow
and Steady Progress on Corporate Tax Shelters, 84 TAX NOTES 191, 191-99 (1999) (discussing the
debate over marketing and promoting tax shelters); John J. Tigue, Public Enemy No. -- Corporate
Tax Shelters, N. Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 1999, at 3 (discussing corporate tax shelters generally).
132. B. John Williams, Jr., IRS Chief Counsel Speech on Privilege and Shelters, Address Before
the Texas Federal Tax Institute (June 6, 2002), in TAX NOTES TODAY, June 7, 2002, at 110-29.
133. Robert T. Smith, After the Alamo: Taxpayer Claims of Privilege and the IRS War on Tax
Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 233, 234 (2003).
134. A similar enforcement action against another firm, Ernst & Young, was dismissed when the
IRS discovered the clients' identities through other means. Sheryl Stratton, Identity Privilege Pits
Shelter Clients Against Accounting Firms, 98 TAX NOTES 168, 168 (2003).
135. See Lee A. Sheppard, Government Shuts Down PICO Shelter and Its Progeny, 97 TAX
NOTES 31, 31-36 (2002) (discussing Ernst & Young tax shelter that reduced the individual tax basis
and the IRS's discovery of the shelter); Sheryl Stratton, KPMG Promoter Summons Enforcement
Action Goes to Court, 97 TAX NOTES 26, 27-30 (2002) (discussing the merits of KPMG's assertion
of privilege regarding communication with clients).
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grounds: the federally authorized tax practitioner privilege 36 and the
attorney-client privilege. 137
Several judicial opinions have been issued thus far, 3 8 but they. surely
will not end the matter. A lot of litigation (and, quite probably, a lot of
lobbying) lies ahead before the privilege issues in this context are finally
resolved, and this is but one front of the war against corporate tax
shelters.
2.

Need for Resources

The promising enforcement initiatives described immediately above
can succeed only if they receive adequate resources. This means three
things: money to defray expenses, personnel to staff the projects, and
training so that the personnel have the skills to do the work well.
Insufficient amounts of these "factors of enforcement" were directly
implicated in the low and declining enforcement of recent years. The
IRS and others have attributed such decline to, in part, decreases in
absolute numbers of staff, shift of staff away from enforcement (into
39
taxpayer service and other functions), and loss of experienced agents.
This last item bears amplification. Merely handing the taxpayer's
return to a warm body who receives a federal paycheck does not
guarantee a quality examination, nor does giving a transcript of an
account to such a person guarantee effective collection. The agent
assigned must possess a level of skill equal to the challenges presented
by the particular case.
The requisite skills might come from experience. However, low
salaries have been the lot of IRS agents for decades, 40 so the IRS
136. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1).
137. Sheryl Stratton, KPMG Privilege Logs Are Under Scrutiny; Court Wants More Detail, 97
TAX NOTES 165, 165 (2002); Todd Welty, IRS Aggressively Challenges Privilege, TAX ADVISER,
Oct. 2002, at 670.
138. United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 48 (D.D.C. 2002); United States v. BDO
Seidman, LLP, 225 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. 111.2002), amended by, 2002 WL 932365 (N.D. Il. 2003).
139. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, IRS Enforcement Drops Sharply, 83 TAX NOTES 188, 189 (1999)
(discussing the decline in IRS enforcement levels); George Guttman, The Interplay of Enforcement
and Voluntary Compliance, 83 TAX NOTES 1683, 1683 (1999) (discussing the decision of IRS
management to shift resources).
140. The private sector's average starting salaries for accounting graduates and for junior
lawyers considerably exceed such salaries paid by the government. Durst, supra note 32, at 17.
"The conclusion cannot be avoided . . . that currently inadequate levels of compensation are
crippling tax administration in this country." Id. at 19. Again, "the extremely low level of
compensation of IRS personnel in many categories of employment constitutes a severe and
increasing danger to the fair and effective administration of the tax law." Id. at 5.
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typically will not be able to hire highly experienced auditors. Moreover,
in recent years, the IRS has been suffering high attrition among its most
experienced examination and collection agents.' 4 ' The era of individual
tax shelters in the 1960's through 1980's materially altered the nature of
the IRS's workload. Individual cases requiring thorough audit skills
were dwarfed by mass cases-numerous "investors" in partnerships
which, while numerous, mostly divided along well recognized generic
lines. The bases on which the IRS disallowed the tax benefits claimed
through the shelters were well recognized and generic too, so much so
that deficiency notices were composed by typing numerical codes which
spit out paragraphs of standardized language. 42 In this period, the IRS
gained skills in processing masses of paper but lost skills in individual
auditing. There is concern that something similar is happening to the
collection function now as a result of the tidal wave of offer-incompromise processing inundating the IRS. 143
Thus, adequate staffing for enforcement initiatives will require many
agents, skilled agents. That requires substantial training efforts. Such
efforts entail their own resource demands: the trainees are handling no
cases while they are being trained and the trainers-experienced
agents-are pulled out of their work to disseminate their skills.
Accordingly, the requisite training will entail a major additional
commitment of resources.
However, the major investment of money, personnel, and training
must be made. Without it, enforcement will continue to languish. To
make the point, consider the following examples.
Gift tax enforcement: This problem was explored in a widely noticed
article by David Cay Johnston of the New York Times. 44 The article
141. "Because of factors such as inadequate training, uncompetitive salaries and IRS bashing,
many well-qualified people do not consider IRS employment, or if hired, leave the Service." 1998
Oversight Hearings, supra note 89, at *69 (statement of Michael Mares of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants).
Moreover, "fin recent years there seems to have been an
unprecedented turnover in IRS personnel."
James E. Wheeler, Chevron Case Raises Serious
Questions, 82 TAX NoTs 259, 259-460 (1999) (referring to "the turnstile outflow from IRS
employment" to the private sector).
142. See, e.g., Scar v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 855, 859 (1983), rev'd, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.
1987) (discussing an error whereby a transposed number entered by an IRS employee produced a
standardized document that asserted a deficiency based on the Nevada Mining Project; the actual
deficiency was from a videotape tax shelter).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 171-76.
144. David Cay Johnston, IRS Sees Increase in Evasion of Taxes on Gifts to Heirs, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2000, § 1, at 1. Mr. Johnston's reporting has rendered major contributions to our
appreciation of how our tax laws are administered (or not administered). He has received a Pulitzer
Prize for it.
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established two main points. First, there is a major problem with gift tax
compliance: "[A] far greater percentage of Americans who owe gift taxes
shortchange the government than do Americans paying income taxes and
other levies. What is more, the sums involved in each case are much
larger." 145 Those figures
establish that "we have a compliance problem"
16
in the gift tax area.
Second, a major cause of the problem-or of the inability to correct
it-is lack of resources, particularly staff competent to handle the
complex issues presented by large gift returns. The IRS, its auditing and
legal staff shrinking in recent years even as the number of complex tax
returns grows, lacks the resources to find most taxpayers who
underreport their taxable gifts or fail to file required gift tax returns. 147 In
1999, the IRS had only 78 lawyers assigned to gift tax audits, each
responsible for auditing more than 3300 gift tax returns. 148 "And even
when the agency does find abuses, it lacks the resources to fight more
than a small number of the cases in court. IRS lawyers said they were
frustrated by their inability to stop what they described as rampant
cheating on gift taxes."' 149 An IRS attorney in Manhattan, "said his desk
was piled high with gift tax returns that will get little scrutiny. 15 'There
is all this added work and no staff, said the lawyer, who insisted he not
be identified.' 5' The IRS lawyer added, "'I know that there are millions
and millions and millions of dollars being passed
untaxed right over my
52
desk and there is nothing I can do about it."1

The problem existed in other districts as well. The IRS's Fresno
office received about 11,000 gift tax returns in 1999 and had only three
examiners to audit them. 53 IRS examiners
spent about a half hour
154
return.
tax
gift
large
complex,
each
auditing
145.

Id. at 20.

According to IRS statistics, "[miore than 80 percent of the 1,651 tax returns

reporting gifts of $1 million or more that were audited last year understated the value of the gift."
The average understatement was about $303,000; the average deficiency about $167,000; and the
revenue loss to the federal fisc about $275 million. Id. at 1.
146. Id. at 20 (quoting Tom Hull, IRS national director of specialty taxes). This occurred despite
the IRS's suggestion in 1998 that it might begin to increase its examination of gift tax returns.
Barton Massey, IRS May Increase Examination of Gift Tax Returns, Official Says, 79 TAX NOTES
936, 936 (1998).
147. Johnston, supra note 144, at 20 (citing John Dalrymple, IRS Director of Operations).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing former IRS estate tax attorney Joseph D'Amico).
154. Id.
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Withholding and Employment Tax Enforcement: Except for some
tax protestors, most tax avoidance and evasion is covert for obvious
reasons. Thus, it is a clear sign of trouble when the non-compliant
noisily go public. In recent years, we have seen that happen in the
employment tax area. "Arguing that the federal tax laws do not apply to
them, [some] small companies are thumbing their noses at the I.R.S....
[T]hey have not only stopped withholding taxes and turning them over to
the government, they are also bragging about it on Web sites and radio
talk shows . . . .
These companies received substantial national
publicity. They even organized seminars to promote "the gospel of
compliance," and they repeatedly claimed that they had to be correct
under the law since the IRS had not come after them despite the
abundant publicity given to them and their position. 56
There was some enforcement action during the time, of course. 5 7
Nonetheless, the IRS was infuriatingly slow to respond to the open
defiance of some small businesses. 158 Years after the initial public acts
of defiance, the IRS still was threatening that it59 "will" catch evaders,
rather than announcing that it "had" gotten them. 1
Again, lack of sufficient resources was a large part of the problem.
In reply to criticism of its slow response to public, noisy evasion of
withholding and employment taxes, the IRS said that it has limited
60
resources, so it must choose which tax compliance battles it will fight.'
As noted, the current enforcement initiatives involve items like
offshore credit cards and accounts, high-income non-filing and
underreporting, abusive trusts, and tax shelters.'16
In terms of audit
difficulty, these areas clearly exceed withholding and employment tax
155. David Cay Johnston, Defying the I.R.S., Anti-Tax Businesses Refuse to Withhold, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, § 1, at 1.

156. Id.
157. According to the IRS website, between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2000, 127 persons
were criminally convicted for evading employment taxes and 85% of them "were sentenced to an
average of 17 months in prison." Bergin, supra note 54, at 1220.
158. The small business sector has been an area of low compliance for generations, especially
when much of their trade is in cash. For discussions of this sector, see Durst, supra note 32, at 2334; David Joulfaian & Mark Rider, Differential Taxation and Tax Evasion by Small Businesses, 51
NAT'L TAX J. 675 (1998). At one time, the IRS estimated that less than half of the taxes owed by
self-employed taxpayers were paid voluntarily. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GROSS TAX GAP
ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1973-1992, 6 (1988).

159. See Bergin, supra note 54, at 1220 (discussing the IRS Criminal Investigation Division's
plans to prosecute more tax evaders).
160. See Johnston, supra note 144, § 1, at 1 (discussing the IRS's lack of resources to stop gift
tax evasion).
161. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
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evasion. Some of them-particularly shelters-rival gift tax returns in
difficulty. Some of them too-like foreign accounts and trusts-while
not particularly difficult in concept, will entail great time and efforts to
successfully address.
Thus, the experience of gift tax and employment tax enforcement
failures suggests that current enforcement thrusts will be blunted unless
they are powered by adequate resources. 162 Finding and applying those
resources is crucial to improved tax compliance through enforcement.
III. THE RESOURCES BIND
We have seen that tax compliance in the United States is
unsatisfactory, and that additional resources are needed to support the
mainstays of compliance: service and enforcement. Will additional
resources be forthcoming for these purposes?
Unfortunately, the likely answer is in the negative. Congress and
recent administrations have subjected the IRS to a resource squeeze. On
the one hand, particularly through RRA '98, Congress imposed vast new
demands and obligations on the IRS. On the other hand, IRS budgets
proposed by the administrations and enacted by Congress conspicuously
failed to provide the resources required
for these new demands and the
63
old ones on which they were heaped. 1
A.

RRA 1998: New Demands

RRA '98 commanded numerous changes to the organization and
direction of the IRS 164 and to its examination, collection, and other
162. Those failures are not the only examples, of course. The Treasury estimates that "[miore
than $13 billion in unpaid taxes [go] uncollected [currently] because the IRS lacks the resources to
pursue them." Alan Fram, President Targets Tax Scofflaws, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 2, 2003, at
IOA.
163. The IRS is not free from its share of blame. A key component of both taxpayer service and
enforcement is an adequate technological infrastructure. The IRS's mismanagement of its computer
systems and of the billions Congress appropriated to improve them has been one of the longer
running stories in Washington, D.C.-leaving the spectator, by turns, amused, exasperated, and
angry. As to recent IRS technological efforts and needs, see IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD ANNUAL
REPORT 3-4 & 22-23 (2002).
164. It is hoped that the reorganization of the IRS commanded by RRA '98 will, in the long run,
improve the IRS's responsiveness to its "customers." Yet, I incline towards the view expressed by
former IRS Commissioner Sheldon Cohen that the costs of RRA '98 reorganization will never be
recouped. Sheryl Stratton, Former Commissioners See Challenges Facing the Tax System, 94 TAx
NOTES 693, 694 (2002). At the least, in the short run, there is little doubt that the reorganization
contributed to the decrease of the agency's enforcement activities in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
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functions.1 65 Of the scores of changes, I want here to emphasize three
which have had major resources effects: offer-in-compromise
liberalization, the collection due process rules, and spousal relief
liberalization. Both individually and collectively, these three changes
have claimed a large portion of the time and personnel of the IRS and of
the courts as well.
1. Offer-in-compromise (OIC) Liberalization
Offers-in-compromise are not new. For generations, the Code has
given the IRS authority to compromise tax liabilities. 66 However, the
IRS's exercise of this authority was criticized long and loudly. The
complaints included that the IRS accepted too few offers, that offer
processing was cumbersome and prolix, that there was insufficient
review of decisions to reject offers, and that the IRS's willingness to
accept offers varied widely throughout the country.167
168
RRA '98 responded to such criticisms. Its particular changes,
although important, were secondary to the general sense Congress was
trying to convey to the IRS: make the offer process easier and more
forgiving and accept more offers. Although the IRS has made changes to
the offer program, 69 practitioners often complain that the IRS has been
too slow to 70implement the RRA '98 changes or has done so
incompletely. 1
See, e.g., Joe Thomdike, The Price of Reorganization: FewerAudits and Tax Forgiveness, 96 TAX
NOTES 1308, 1308 (2002).
165. For description of the RRA '98 changes, see Restructuring and Reforming the IRS and the
Code-Congress Takes a Quantum Leap, 89 J. TAX'N 133, 133 (Martin M. Lore & Gerald A. Kafka
eds., 1998); Gerald A. Kafka, Reformation of the Tax Collection Process-Cumulatively,a Giant
Step, 89 J. TAx'N 207, 207 (1998); Robert Manning & David F. Windish, The IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act: An Explanation, 80 TAX NOTES 83, 83 (1998).
166. I.R.C. § 7422.
167. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Garr, Cutting a Deal with the IRS in 1997: Forms over Substance,
76 TAX NOTES 547, 548 (1997) (discussing current failings in the offer-in-compromise process).
168. See I.R.C. § 7422(c) (requiring the IRS to issue national and local guidelines for use in
determining the adequacy of offers); I.R.C. § 7422(d) (requiring establishment of independent
administrative review procedures before rejection of an offer is communicated to the taxpayer).
169. Those changes culminated in 2002 with the adoption of new final regulations. Treas. Reg.
§§ 301.7122-0, 301.7122-1 (as amended by T.D. 9007, 2002-33 I.R.B. 349); 67 FED. REG. 48025
(July 23, 2002); correctedby 67 FED. REG. 53878 (Aug. 20, 2002).
170. Letter from John K Harris, CEO of JK Harris & Company, to Nina Olson, National
Taxpayer Advocate (May 20, 2002), reprinted in PractitionerOffers Suggestions for Improving
IRS's OIC Program, 95 TAX NOTES, 1263, 1263 (2002); Robert E. McKenzie, New Offer-inCompromise Program Creates Settlement Roadblocks, 96 TAX NOTES 1105, 1105 (2002); Amy
Hamilton, IRS Still Doesn't Have Offers ProgramRight, PractitionersSay, 82 TAX NOTES 774, 774
(1999).
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Whatever the merit of these criticisms, two facts are clear. First, the
number of offers the IRS has to consider is huge and increasing. For
instance, in FY 2000 the IRS received about 109,000 offers and in FY
2001 it received 72
about 125,000.'
The IRS is now receiving over 2300
offers per week. 1

Second, the effort to swim through this deluge of offers has imposed
immense resource strains on the IRS. "The IRS has a huge backlog of
offers and has been devoting more and more of its limited collection
resources to processing them."' 173 More specifically:
To meet this demand the IRS reassigned staff from other collection programs,
such as delinquent account and tax return investigations, to the offers
program-more than doubling the number of direct collection field staff hours
charged to the program. In fact, according to a General Accounting Office
report released last week, IRS collection field staff hours devoted exclusively to
working offers increased from 728,000 hours in fiscal 1997 to about 1.6 million
hours in fiscal 2001. During that same period the number of direct hours
charged to all IRS field collection activities declined by about 30 percent, from
about 12.7 million hours in fiscal 1997 to about 8.9 million hours in fiscal
2001.
What this means in plain English is that the share of total IRS direct field
collection staff hours devoted exclusively to the offers program grew from
about 6 percent in fiscal 1997 to 18 percent in fiscal 2001.'74

Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, puts the figure even
higher. She calculates that one quarter of the IRS's field collection
function is consumed entirely by offer-in-compromise work. 7 5 She
sounded an alarm bell when she exclaimed: "We've [the IRS176 has]
become an offer shop! ... We need a more sane approach to this."'
The IRS has taken some steps. For instance, it centralized offer
submissions (directing that all offers be sent to either of two compliance

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2001 IRS DATA BOOK 21, tbl.16 (2001).
172. Amy Hamilton, IRS Reform, Year 4: "We've Become an Offer Shop", 95 TAX NoTEs 17,
17 (2002).
173. McKenzie, supra note 170, at 1105.
174. Hamilton, supra note 172, at 17. Not surprisingly in light of these facts, "IRS officials told
171.

the GAO that devoting so many collection resources to the OIC program might be hurting other
collection programs." Id. at 18.
175. Id. at 17.
176. Id. at 18 (quoting Nina Olson).
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centers) and implemented strict processing rules. 177 In addition,78the IRS
is seeking to impose user fees on some taxpayers making offers.1
But such steps are fingers in holes of a dike that is severely cracking.
The IRS is "committed to maintaining a viable and credible [offers]
program for taxpayers who are serious about compromise.', 179 Yet its
inventory of unresolved offers has grown rapidly. 80 Recent changes
may allow reduction of the backlog, but they are unlikely to 8liberate
resources from the offers program for reallocation to other areas.' '
2. Collection Due Process (CDP) rules
RRA '98 created new procedures whereby taxpayers can challenge
IRS enforced collection actions. These procedures are triggered at two
times: after the IRS files notice of a tax lien' 82 and before the IRS effects
levy. 183 At these times, the IRS must notify the taxpayer of her right to
administrative review through the IRS Appeals Office (Appeals) and, if
Appeals sustains the action, to judicial review through the Tax Court or
district court, depending on which has jurisdiction over the type of tax
involved.' 84

Thus, the principal demands of the CDP regime are on Appeals and
the courts. The initial case load predictions were dire indeed. Before
177. McKenzie, supra note 170, at 1105.
These steps have been criticized as creating
"unnavigable roadblocks for submitting offers." Id.
178. User Fees for Processing Offers to Compromise, 67 Fed. Reg. 67573 (proposed Nov. 6,
2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 300); Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Proposes
User Fee for Certain Offer-in-Compromise Requests (Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with Westlaw, 2002
WL 31473834).
179. Hamilton, supra note 172, at 18 (quoting then-IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti).
180. "[Bletween fiscal 1997 and 2001 the inventory of unresolved offers almost tripled. The
percentage of offers processed by the IRS within six months dropped from 64 percent to 32 percent."
Id. at 17.
181. Recently, OIC processing has been proceeding more rapidly and the case backlog has
declined. However,
much of this progress may be a result of the rigid enforcement of deadlines by the IRS.
Hence, some sources say that many new offers are often resubmissions because the IRS
will close cases on technicalities due to the pressure to reduce the inventory. Thus, the
OIC improvements may be illusory because of churning.
George Guttman, Oversight Board Concerned About IRS Budget Situation, 97 TAX NOTES 1404,
1405 (2002).
182. I.R.C. § 6320.
183. I.R.C. § 6330.
184. For detailed discussion of the CDP rules, see Leslie Book, The New Collection Due Process
Taxpayer Rights, 86 TAx NoTEs 1127, 1127 (2000) [hereinafter Book I]; Leslie Book, Due Process
and New Process: New Taxpayer Notice, Hearing and Judicial Review Rights in IRS Collection
Actions, 3 CMTY. TAX LAW REP. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Book I].
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RRA '98, the IRS annually issued around nine million collection
notices.' 85 However, anticipating the effect of CDP, the IRS instituted a
pre-notice screening procedure that reduced the number of notices to
between three and four million.'"
Based187 on this, the Tax Court
year.
per
cases
CDP
new
105,000
anticipated
This prediction has not come to pass. Nonetheless, two points. First,
collectively, CDP cases consume large amounts of resources,
administrative and judicial. Administratively, the Appeals Office had a
total of 52,282 cases pending as of October 1, 2001. The great bulk
(43,348) were non-docketed cases, 14,829 of which-that is, over 34
percent of non-docketed cases and over 28 percent of all Appeals
cases-were collection cases. 88 Not all of the collection cases were
CDP cases, but many were.' 89 Judicially, CDP cases have become one of
the most common types of case handled by the Tax Court. One has but
to skim any recent volume of the regular or the memorandum decisions
of the Tax Court to appreciate the prevalence of CDP litigation.' 90
3. Spousal Relief
Spouses who file joint income tax returns become jointly and
severally liable for any taxes, interest, and penalties with respect to the
tax year in question.' 9' To mitigate the possible severity of that regime,
the Code has long contained some relief mechanisms. 92 RRA '98
substantially revised and liberalized such relief. 93 Now, there are three
distinct bases of relief: (i) innocent spouse relief available regardless of
185. Sheryl Stratton, Collection Due Process Notices Are Starting to Go Out, 22 TAX PRACTICE,
198, 198 (May 17, 1999) (citing then-IRS District Counsel T. Keith Fogg).
186. Id. As to levy notices, the IRS first decides whether assets exist. Absent identifiable assets,
the IRS will not issue the levy notice.
187. Sheryl Stratton, Tax Court Preparesfor Collection Due Process Actions, 82 TAx NOTES
1554, 1554 (1999).
188. 2001 DATA BOOK supra note 29, at 21, tbl.17. An additional forty collection cases were
docketed.
189. For the 2000 through 2002 fiscal years, the IRS received a total of 52,677 CDP cases.
National Taxpayer Advocate, FY 2002 ANN. REP. To CONGRESS 110, tbl. 1.15.1.
190. A computer search on February 6, 2003, disclosed over 160 Tax Court CDP decisions from
2000 to date. CDP was among the ten most frequently adjudicated tax issues in both FY2001 and
FY 2002. National Taxpayer Advocate, FY 2002 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 253; National Taxpayer
Advocate, FY 2001 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 259.
191. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
192. Current I.R.C. § 6015, enacted by RRA '98, replaced former I.R.C. § 6013(e).
193. For a description of the revised provisions, see Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New
Innocent Spouse Provision: 'Reason and Law Walking Hand in Hand'?, 80 TAx NOTES 835, 835
(1998).
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current marital status, 194 (ii) apportioned liability available only to
195
spouses who separated or divorced after filing the return in question,
and (iii) catch-all relief available in situations deemed to merit relief but
not meeting the requirements of the other two categories. 196
The precise numbers differ, of course, but the same picture emerges
for the spousal relief changes as for the OIC and CDP changes: lots of
additional work requiring staff diverted from other functions. The
response, in numbers of claims filed, far exceeded what Congress, the
IRS, and the private sector expected. The flow started when the law
became effective and grew quickly thereafter. It had reached about 1000
cases a week in February 1999 and 1200 a week in May 2000.'9' By
mid-2000, the IRS had received nearly 79,000 spousal relief claims from
46,000 taxpayers. 198 Viewing the "tremendous" and growing inventory
of spousal relief cases, an IRS official described § 6015 as the "section
from hell."' 99

To respond, the IRS expended "millions of dollars and thousands of
200
In FY 1999, there
personnel hours" processing spousal relief claims.
were 415 full-time equivalent IRS employees working spousal relief
20
cases, "most ... plucked directly from the IRS's examination ranks." '
In FY 2001, the equivalent of 953 full-time employees were allocated
exclusively to such work.20 2 The IRS planned to draw the requisite staff
from the ranks of tax auditors.20 3 The courts have felt the burden too.
Spousal relief cases are among the largest categories in the Tax Court's
current inventory. 204
194. I.R.C. § 6015(b).
195. I.R.C. § 6015(c).
196. I.R.C. § 6015(f).
197. Barton Massey, IRS Receiving Rising Number of Innocent Spouse Relief Cases, 83 TAX
NOTES 1543, 1543 (1999).
198. Sheryl Stratton & Emily Field, Innocent Spouse Issues Plague Practitioners, IRS, and
Courts, 87 TAx NOTES 1575, 1575 (2000).
199. Massey, supra note 197, at 1543 (quoting Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., IRS Assistant
Commissioner (Examination)).
200. Ryan J. Donmoyer, The New Innocent Spouse Relief. More PopularThan Anyone Thought,
87 TAX NOTES 1023, 1023 (2000).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Massey, supra note 197, at 1543.
204. Like CDP, spousal relief also was among the ten (10) most frequently litigated tax issues in
both FY 2001 and FY 2002. National Taxpayer Advocate, FY 2002 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 256;
National Taxpayer Advocate, FY 2002 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 258. A computer search on
February 6, 2003, disclosed over three score § 6015 Tax Court decisions from 1999 to date. This is
the tip of the iceberg, of course, since many more cases are currently docketed awaiting trial or
decision and many former cases were resolved before trial and decision.
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B. Budgets: Insufficient Support
Like all governmental agencies, the IRS has experienced some better
years and some worse years in budgeting. More often than not, the IRS
has not received the level of appropriations needed to fully support its
obligations. "Historically, the lack of a political constituency has
contributed to a level of funding for tax administration which almost
certainly is far less than optimal. 2 °5 Beyond the absence of positive
support, some perceive actual opposition to adequate funding of the IRS,
beyond normal inter-functional budgetary competition. Some may view
constraining IRS funding as a back-door way to achieve tax cuts. 2°6 I
would be reluctant to ascribe this attitude to any particular person or
group, but I would not be surprised if it exists in some minds.
One sometimes hears that the IRS has been "fully" funded, but the
terminology can be confusing. The key question is whether the IRS is
adequately funded, i.e., whether it has enough appropriations to come
reasonably close to being able to satisfactorily discharge its diverse
obligations.2 °7 Adequacy typically has not been reached, and surely has
not been reached in recent decades.
For example, the FY 2002 IRS budget was disappointing. 20 The FY
2003 did not improve the situation.20 9 As to it, Larry Levitan, then chair
of the IRS Oversight Board, stated:
205. Durst, supra note 32, at 12. This note was echoed recently by the former chair of the IRS
Oversight Board:
the reason that the IRS does not get adequately funded is that there is no powerful
constituency that champions the IRS. No member of Congress ever got a single vote by
telling his constituency that he got more resources for the IRS. There is no
administration that sees the overwhelming motivation to support the IRS the way it needs
to be. There are never enough resources to do everything that is wanted and needed and
the IRS loses in the priority battle.
George Guttman, The IRS's Fiscal 2004 Budget: More or Less?, 98 TAX NOTES 486, 488 (2003)
(quoting Larry Levitan).
206. Former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander is reported to believe that the current
administration harbors this view. Guttman, supra note 205, at 487.
207. Here's how the dance is choreographed:
Every year the IRS goes through the same routine. It asks the administration for X
dollars of funding for the next fiscal year. X is the amount the IRS thinks it needs to do
its job, adjusted for the probability of getting that amount. The administration then
usually proposes to give the IRS less than it requested, or Y dollars. Congress, based on
appropriations the past few years, gives the IRS almost all the Y dollars. This is known
as full, rather than adequate, funding.
George Guttman, What Would an Adequately FundedIRS Look Like?, 97 TAX NOTES 36, 37 (2002).
208. See, e.g., George Guttman, Administration'sBudget Request May Crimp IRS Hiring Plans,
90 TAX NOTES 1286, 1286 (2001) (discussing inadequacy of budget proposal causing problems with
IRS's hiring plans); George Guttman, IRS Budget Growth Smaller Than Desired Sources Say, 90
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Concern about rising noncompliance has resulted in very appropriate demands
for the IRS to significantly increase enforcement activities. However, the
Oversight Board believes that the administration's request is inadequate and
will not enable the IRS to perform significantly more enforcement. If Congress
wants adequate enforcement to ensure a fair system for all it will need to
appropriate more than the administration requested.21

Shortly before the Symposium of which this Article is a part, the
administration released its proposed FY 2004 budget. It would give the
IRS a budget of $10.4 billion, an increase of 5.3%. This would include
$133 million for additional audits of companies and high-income
individuals, including those who hide income offshore, which is among
the IRS's new compliance initiatives. 211
This is not a dreadful IRS budget by historical standards. Neither,
though, is it a-meaningful improvement. Congress may not approve the
full amount requested, and if it does, that would guarantee nothing for
future budgets.
Moreover, were the FY 2004 proposal enacted without reduction, the
IRS would be far from adequately funded. Indeed, "after considering
several variables, the end result [of the $10.4 billion proposal] may be
that the IRS will not receive a budget increase at all. ''213 First, more than
half of the ostensible 5.3% increase would merely cover mandatory cost

TAX NOTES 1138, 1138 (2001) (discussing the apparent inadequacy of the IRS budget); George
Guttman, The Bush Administration's IRS Budget for Fiscal Year 2002, 91 TAX NOTES 200, 200
(2001) (discussing the shortcomings and possible problems with FY 2001 budget); Amy Hamilton,
IRS Oversight Board Prepares for Budget Face-Off, 90 TAX NOTES 1766, 1766 (2001) (containing
comments regarding inadequacy of 2002 budget proposal).
209. See, e.g., George Guttman, IRS Faces Budget Crunch, 95 TAX NOTES 1546, 1546 (2002)
(explaining that the IRS has slowed spending because of a 2002 funding rescission and
"disappointment in the Bush Administration's proposed 2003 IRS budget"); Hamilton, supra note
20, at 290-91 (stating that "the administration's [2003] IRS budget request is $92 million lower than
what the IRS Oversight Board recommended" and may be based on optimistic assumptions). Id.
210. Hamilton, supra note 40,at 1264.
211. Fram, supra note 162, at 10A. Other uses include an additional $100 million to gather
information to support earned income tax credit enforcement and allowing private collection
agencies to collect unpaid taxes on behalf of the IRS (a proposal that failed in the past because of
concerns about taxpayers' rights). Id.
212. The Administration projects a record deficit of $304 billion in FY 2004. Fram, supra note
162, at 10A. This fact, combined with other spending priorities like military needs and the campaign
against terrorism, may make this and future Congresses eager to cut discretionary spending wherever
it can. In the past, it often was argued that increased spending on the IRS would yield even larger
amounts in additional revenue collected, but that argument has lost force politically. See, e.g.,
Guttman, supra note 3, at 1004 ("[tlhe Office of Management and Budget has substantially pared
back the IRS budget authorization request for business modernization for fiscal 2004").
213. Guttman, supra note 205, at 486.
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increases, including pay increases and inflation.21 4 Second, Congress
may ultimately require yet greater civilian pay increases and compel the
agencies, including the IRS, to defray those increases themselves.2 15
Third, some of the increases to some areas are predicated on the IRS
achieving and reallocating certain cost savings. The IRS's record in
realizing projected savings is not impressive. The current hypothecated
savings may well be overstated. 216
The IRS hoped for $10.7 billion, not $10.4 billion, for the coming
year. 217 Yet even the extra $300 million would not be adequate. A
recent article (based on statements by former IRS Commissioner
Rossotti) totaled the IRS's "wish list" for customer service, collection,
nonfiler and underreporting cases, abusive trusts and offshore accounts,
high-income taxpayers, and large corporations. 2 18 The overall amount?
"The IRS's wish is to get an extra 35,000 full-time staff. This would cost
219
about $2.5 billion in labor each year, and even more in support costs.,
This would be a staff increase of about 35% and (even without the extra
support costs) a budget increase of about 25%.220
Perhaps these figures correctly depict a fully adequate budget;
perhaps they are overstated. But increases of even half of the above
amounts are wholly infeasible politically. Recognizing that, the IRS
does not even request budgets of such magnitude.
Yet, absent adequate funding, budget reallocations are a game of
"robbing Peter to pay Paul." If more goes to taxpayer service, less will
go to enforcement.22 '
If the new enforcement initiatives receive
substantial funding, some other important aspect(s) of tax administration
will suffer.
One thinks, in this connection, of the principle of physics known as
Boyle's Law (or, in France, Mariotte's Law). That principle states that
(at constant temperature) the volume of gas varies inversely with its
214. Id.
215. Id. at 487.
216. Id.
217. Adding the IRS "want list" to the administration's $10.4 billion, the amount would have
been $10.7 billion, which would have been an 8% increase, and would have permitted a staff
increase of 1.2%. George Guttman, What the IRS Wants for Fiscal 2004, 97 TAX NOTES 1127, 1127

(2002).
218. Guttman, supranote 207, at 38.
219. Id. at 38.
220. Id. With such increases, the IRS thinks it could produce an extra $30 billion in revenue
annually. Id.
221. "The pendulum swings back and forth every few years between compliance and customer
service, but there is no consensus on how best to proceed." Guttman, supra note 207, at 37.
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pressure. The principle explains why, when one squeezes a balloon in
one place, it tends to expand in another. Similarly, in a constrained
budget environment, squeezing one service or compliance area (by
reallocating funds to it) requires removing the administrative hand from
another part of the balloon, causing that area to bulge out.
In sum, we currently lack adequate tax administration resources,
caused in part by additional demands (including those imposed by RRA
'98) unmatched by additional budgeting. With inadequate resources, we
can choose where to push for compliance. But the resultant neglect of
other areas will cause noncompliance in them to expand.
If budgeting cannot be depended upon to be adequate, resources to
better grip the whole of the compliance balloon will have to be found
elsewhere. That can come only from decreasing demands on the IRS,
and such decreases are most likely to be achieved through simplification
of the tax system. It is to that possibility that we now turn.
IV.

SIMPLIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Simplification has been called the "holy grail" of tax reform. 222 It
has been justified on many grounds including (i) reduced compliance
costs for taxpayers,223 (ii) greater popular support for the tax system, (iii)
greater transparency of the system, and (iv) greater fairness.224
Simplification also has been justified on grounds related to
225
In many areas, the tax law is so complex or so ambiguous
compliance.
that many taxpayers who want to file accurate returns are defeated by

222. Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIsC. L. REv. 1267
(1990). In tax as in the original legends, though, the grail is understood differently by different
people. See, e.g., Boris I.Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation-Then and Now, 74 TAX NOTES 903,
906 (1997) (identifying definition of a comprehensive tax base as the "holy grail" of tax policy).
223. The IRS has developed a new microsimulation model to measure taxpayer compliance
burdens (such as time and money) and to estimate such burdens that could result from proposed tax
law changes. This could give compliance burdens greater impact in consideration of tax legislation
and assist in simplification efforts. See Ayayo, Field & Thorndike, supra note 77, at 1013
(describing the microsimulation model and its usefulness).
224. See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKI.A, supra note 30, at ch.5 (describing the complexity of our tax
system and how it can be fixed); Michael A. Andrews, Tax Simplification, 47 SMU L. REV. 37, 3839 (1993) (noting the need for tax simplification); Joseph A. Snoe, Tax Simplification and Fairness:
FourProposalsfor Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 ALB. L. REV. 61, 63-64 (1996) (highlighting the
complexities of the tax system).
225. "[Tloday's tax complexity . . .clearly decreases levels of voluntary compliance," in
addition to raising compliance costs and reducing the perceived fairness of the tax system. Patti
Mohr, Specialists Discuss Simplification in Light of Bush's Tax Plan, 91 TAX NOTES 867, 868
(2001) (citing Lindy L. Paul, then chief of staff of Joint Committee on Taxation).
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their inability to know with certainty what the law commands of them.2 26
Of course, the tax law has become even more complex with each passing
year. Return preparers and return preparation computer software are in
increasing use, 22 7 but they are no guarantee that the return will be
correct. 22

Computer programs are no better than the information

inputted, and return preparers often make errors.229
When taxpayers do understate their liabilities-either because of
honest error or because they were aggressive-complexity decreases the
chance that the IRS will detect the understatement. The unpleasant but
unavoidable fact is that, even when a return is examined, IRS agents
often miss adjustments that should be made. Complexity is one reason.
230
Too often, the law is too complex for IRS agents to apply effectively.
The foregoing connections between complexity and compliance are
genuine, but another connection is the focus of this article.
Simplification of the right kinds can liberate substantial numbers of IRS
personnel from tasks of marginal benefit, permitting their redeployment
to more valuable activities, be they taxpayer service or enforcement. In
this way, the system can at least partly compensate for inadequate
appropriations.
Below, we briefly consider the theoretically available routes to
simplification. The conclusion will be that piecemeal simplification is
more likely to be feasible than major structural changes or realignments

226. Durst, supra note 32, at 49. Decrying complexities introduced by the 1986 legislation, one
study of compliance stated:
It appears that some of the new provisions, and the regulations that implement them, are
so complex as to be beyond the practical abilities of many tax professionals, let alone
taxpayers who seek to file their own returns ....
As a result, many taxpayers, including
some who are receiving professional advice, probably are simply approximating large
portions of their liabilities. Through this process, the image of the tax law as a statement
of social obligation is eroded, replaced by an image of the tax laws as a set of vague
guidelines which the taxpayer has wide latitude to manipulate.
Id.
227. For depiction of growing use of such aids, see Thomas F. Field, 30 Years of Federal,State,
and InternationalTax Policy, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TAXATION 3, 4-5 (2002).
228. A magazine asked 50 return preparers to compute income tax owed by a hypothetical
family on hypothetical facts. The correct answer was around $23,400. The answers given by the
preparers ranged from $12,555 to almost $36,000. The answers averaged over $1500 less than the
correct amount. Only I I of the 50 preparers were particularly close to the correct amount. Greg
Anrig, Jr., The Pros Flunk Our New Tax Test, MONEY, Mar. 1989, at 110.
229. For instance, by April 17 of the 1999 filing season, the IRS had discovered "simple errors"
on nearly a million returns signed by tax practitioners. Karen Hube, IRS Has a Gripe Too: Sloppy
Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1999, at CI.
230. See, e.g., Durst, supra note 32, at 10 (some provisions of the Code "are so complex as to be
virtually unadministrable").
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of responsibilities. That being so, this part proposes five specific
changes-resource-liberating changes-to the RRA '98 rules.
A. TheoreticallyAvailable Routes to Simplification
Broadly speaking, there are at least five possible ways to change the
Code in order to liberate resources for productive redeployment: (1)
impose a moratorium on changes to the Code, (2) relieve the IRS of
obligations unrelated to revenue raising, (3) remove large numbers of
taxpayers from the tax rolls, (4) abolish whole taxes or major
components of taxes, and (5) amend specific substantive or procedural
statutes. Most of these are manifest political non-starters or involve
issues of complexity and weight far beyond the scope of this article.
Thus, we will be left with the fifth avenue as the focus for proposals.
1. Moratorium on Code Changes
Sometimes the best action is inaction. When the tax law frequently
changes and the changes are unclear or fail to anticipate major
implementation issues, the IRS (and taxpayers) are severely burdened.
The need to learn, re-learn, "unlearn," and just make it up as one goes
along, is an invisible yet large cost, claiming time, attention, and energy
that could have been profitably applied to other responsibilities.
There is little doubt that the above describes the current
unsatisfactory pace and quality of federal tax legislative outputs. Each
year brings multiple tax acts, many of them major acts (as in 1997, 1998,
and 2001). Unfortunately, the provisions enacted are of declining quality
in terms of clarity, specificity, and foresight.23' One aspect of this has
been Congress' tendency in recent years to "legislate concepts" rather
than firm provisions, leaving it up to the IRS to sort out the details.232
"[A] process that deals with concepts and not in details, is one that leads
to complexity, because legislators don't always focus on the impact of
their provisions and what kind of burden they may be imposing. 23 3
Both the volume of tax legislative outputs and the declining quality of
231. "The pace of enactments has far outstripped the care that has gone into them." Steve R.
Johnson, Further Thoughts on Interpreting Tax Statutes, 1998 ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWSL. 11, 13
(Winter).
232. Rosina B. Barker & Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Interview with MargaretMilner Richardson,
Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1997 ABA SEC. TAx'N NEWSL. 11, 12 (Summer)

[hereinafter Richardson Interview].
233. Id. at 13.
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them have put substantial pressures on the IRS. Indeed, its job has been
"made worse by each successive Congress. 234
Thus, putting tax legislation on holiday for some years would give
the IRS welcome breathing space, allowing it to fulfill its present duties
better. But, of course, this will not happen. The economic and political
factors that have driven235frenetic tax legislation in recent decades show no
Thus, this relief mechanism will remain purely
signs of losing steam.
a theoretical option.
2. Relief from Non-Revenue Obligations
There was a time when people could seriously argue that the Internal
Revenue Code should be used only to raise revenue. Those days are long
gone.
In the past decade, the President and Congress have used the income tax the
way my mother employed chicken soup: as a magic elixir to solve all the
nation's economic and social difficulties. If the nation has a problem in access
to education, child care affordability, health insurance coverage, or the
financing of236long-term care, an income tax deduction or credit is [viewed as]
the answer.

The examples could easily be multiplied. A major one is the earned
income credit, 237 which is "truly a welfare system grafted onto" the
Code, 238 which means the IRS is "running a negative income tax program
for 25 million" Americans. 239
The fundamental problem is that the IRS is being asked to do too much.
Having to administer [non-revenue responsibilities] ... has diverted IRS audit
resources .... The IRS cannot do all these things well ....
Many it cannot
do at all. We should
not expect it to. A major simplification of the nation's tax
24
law is necessary. 0
234. Stratton, supra note 164, at 693 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Donald C. Alexander).
235. "The current environment in Washington can best be described... as confusing, with lots
of tax bills and lots of tax ideas coming from both sides of the aisle." Patti Mohr, Specialists
Discuss Simplification in Light of Bush's Tax Plan, 91 TAX NOTES 867, 867 (2001) (quoting David

Lifson of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants).
236. Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax
System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 274 (2002) [hereinafter 100 Million Unnessary Returns].

237. I.R.C. § 32.
238. Stratton, supra note 164, at 694 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Margaret Milner
Richardson).
239. Id. (quoting former IRS Commissioner Fred Goldberg, Jr.).
240. 100 Million Unnecessary Returns, supra note 236, at 280-81.
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Amen. Freeing the IRS to concentrate on its core revenue mission
would liberate vast resources to further that mission.
However,
simplification through paring the IRS's non-revenue duties is not in the
political cards. Using the Code to promote the gamut of social programs
is popular with both major political parties and with the public.
Once
242
again, we will have to look elsewhere for the needed relief.
3.

Shrinking the Tax Rolls

A perhaps more promising possibility would be to free large
numbers of low-income taxpayers from income tax liability and therefore
from the need to file returns. There would be substantial resources
savings for the IRS in taxpayer education and service, return processing,
audit, and collection.
Some of this could be accomplished through existing structural
mechanisms by raising the standard deduction or personal exemption
amounts or by excluding some modest amounts of income from
taxability.24 3 Of course, there is a fiscal objection to doing so.244 The

contribution of low-income taxpayers to the total income tax "take" is
modest in percentage terms yet appreciable in absolute dollars.245
There are ways to meet this concern, though. For example, it may be
possible to fashion an expanded withholding system that obviates the
need to file returns for many yet does not lose great amounts of
revenue.246 More ambitiously, Professor Graetz proposes
241. Id.
at 275.
242. A member of the House Ways and Means Committee put it this way:
It is better if you can do things directly rather than using the tax Code, but when we are
talking about trying to help people, empower people... sometimes it is a lot easier for us
to get those policies done through the tax Code and pay the price of complexity of the tax
Code, than to do nothing and to have people who can't find employment in our
community.
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. & Adam J.J. Swirski, Interview with Congressman Ben Cardin (D. Md.),
2002 ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWSL. 17, 19 (Spring).
243. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplifying the Tax System for Low Income Taxpayers, 1995
ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWSL. 10, 10 (Spring) (suggesting changes that would minimize returns and
simplify the process for low-income persons).
244. There also would be political objections. Currently, at least as suggested by the
administration's FY 2004 tax proposals, reducing tax for high-income individuals is more attractive
to some than reducing tax for low-income individuals. For discussion of those proposals, see
William G. Gale, The President'sTax Proposal:FirstImpressions, 98 TAx NOTES 265, 265 (2003).
245. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the
Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 8-9 (1998) (finding that the lowest quintile of
wage earners account for less than 2% of tax revenues).
246. See Snoe, supranote 84, at 111-15 (withholding proposal that would "exempt 50%-80% of
taxpayers from filing tax returns.").
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enacting a value-added tax (VAT)... of 10% to 15% which would finance an
income tax exemption of up to $100,000 and would allow a vastly simpler
income tax at a 25% rate to be applied to incomes over $100,000 without either
losing revenue or247dramatically shifting the tax burden toward middle and lower
income families.

He calculates that this would eliminate "more than 100 million American
families-almost 90% of all filers-from the income tax rolls. 248
There are limitations, to be sure. Merely raising the total income
taxability threshold under the current tax structure would still leave tens
of millions filing, in order to claim the earned income credit. 249 Enacting
a VAT would require audit and regulatory activity to police it.
Nonetheless, the approaches noted here do hold promise, both for
easing IRS resources challenges and for other substantial policy reasons.
Their full analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but I hope they
receive serious consideration in due course.
4.

Abolishing Taxes or Major Components of Taxes

Large resource savings would accrue if otherwise undesirable taxes
or major components of taxes were abolished. Some previous tax
regimes were eventually abolished. 250 Recent history is uneven. We
eliminated the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income in
1986 but resurrected it not long thereafter. 51 We have scheduled the
elimination of the estate tax, but for one year only and the schedule may
never be implemented.252

247. 100 Million Unnecessary Returns, supra note 236, at 282-83.

248. Id. at 286. The 1986 legislation did simplify the tax system for many by effectively putting
them on the standard deduction. See Richardson Interview, supra note 232, at 13.
249. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.

250. For instance, the excess profits, windfall profits, and interest equalization regimes are no
longer with us.
251. Unfortunately. I hope we eliminate it again. See, e.g., Snoe, supra note 84, at 66-85
(discussing complexity arising from historical distinctions between capital gains and ordinary
income); Interview with Calvin H. Johnson: Arnold, White & Durkee CentennialProfessor of Law
University of Texas School of Law, 1993 ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWSL., 27, 30 (Winter) ("[Tlhe
apparent purpose of a capital gains tax-cut is to get rich people to pull their money out of productive
investments so as to consume the capital in a life of luxury.").
252. Moreover, "[e]ven if the 2001 Act's repeal of the estate tax actually takes effect, there will
be pressure for its reinstatement." Graetz, supranote 130, at 176.
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Major areas have been identified as candidates for simplification or
elimination. 53 Some of the early battles will involve the corporate and
individual alternative minimum tax. 25A Plainly, many factors-some of
them of greater moment than the resources effects that are the subject of
this Article-will be part of the debates centering on such major
structural changes. I hope, though, that resource effects will be part of
the discussions.
5.

Amending Specific Statutes

To effect large-scale tax changes, proponents have to muster great
political resources and expend substantial amounts of political capital.
Even with that, they often need more than a little luck as well. 25 5 So,
despite all the sound and fury the country has witnessed in recent
decades as to "tearing the current tax system out by its roots" and
replacing it, such wholesale action---especially in the name of
simplification-is highly unlikely.256
Useful simplifications of the Code are more likely to be achieved
through piecemeal improvements than through radical initiatives. 7 It is
in that vein that the Article now proceeds. Below, we consider
piecemeal statutory changes, centered on RRA '98 rules, that hold
potential for freeing administrative resources for more profitable use,
without eroding beneficial features of the system.
B. Resource LiberationThrough RRA 1998 Simplifications
As we have seen, RRA '98 imposed serious resource demands on the
IRS.258 The Act went too far. Fortunately, its excesses can be moderated
253. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 116, at 5 (mentioning, among other things, repeal of the
alternative minimum tax); Interview with Robert R. Wootton: Tax Legislative Counsel of the
Department of Treasury, 1991 ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWSL., 78,79 (Summer).
254. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman et al., The Individual AMT: Problems and PotentialSolutions,
55 NAT'L TAX J. 555 (2002).
255. For description of how these factors coalesced in the landmark 1986 legislation, see Jasper
L. Cummings, Jr. & Adam J.J. Swirski, Interview with Ronald A. Pearlman,2001 ABA SEC. TAX'N
NEWSL., 20, 20-21 (Winter).

256. See, e.g., Sheldon S. Cohen, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 113,
122 (1997).
257. See, e.g., Warren Rojas, Policymakers Debate Tax Reform, Modernization at AEI Event, 97
TAX NOTES 1375, 1376 (2002) (citing Kenneth J. Kies, former Chief of Staff of Joint Committee on
Taxation); Warren Rojas, Tax Reform Champions Don't Mind Incremental Change, 95 TAX NOTES
1882, 1882 (2002) (citing John Berthoud, President of the National Taxpayer Union Foundation).
258. See infra Part HI.A.
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without unacceptably reducing anything useful.
Specifically, I
recommend five changes. The first three have a common thread:
eliminating the residual, equitable categories of relief for (1) spousal
relief, (2) CDP, and (3) OIC purposes. The other two are particular to
one or another of these regimes. They are (4) remove defined categories
from OIC eligibility and (5) eliminate CDP hearings when only frivolous
issues are asserted.
We consider each of these in turn below. Cumulatively, they should
have appreciable effect. They will not usher in a golden age of resource
adequacy for tax administration, but they will help in a non-trivial way.
1. through 3. Eliminate Residual, Equitable Relief Categories
Three major taxpayer-relief mechanisms established or enlarged by
RRA '98 are spousal relief under I.R.C. § 6015, CDP under I.R.C. §§
6320 and 6330, and OIC under I.R.C. § 7122. In each case, there are
multiple categories of or situations under which relief may be granted.
Some categories and situations are more-or-less defined, but, in addition,
there is under each regime an avenue of relief that is flexible to the point
of open-endedness, that is essentially, perhaps inherently, standard-less.
Below, we first describe those categories, then explain why they should
be eliminated.
Spousal relief: There are three categories of spousal relief. First,
under § 6015(b), relief from joint-and-several income tax liability is
available to all spouses who meet five conditions: (1) a joint return was
made for the year, (2) the return understates tax because of erroneous
items of the other spouse, (3) the spouse claiming relief neither knew nor
had reason to know of the understatement, (4) under all the facts and
circumstances, it would be inequitable to enforce liability upon the
spouse, and (5) the spouse timely elects relief (within two years after the
IRS begins collection against the spouse).259 Second, under § 6015(c),
relief is available for spouses no longer married or living together if (1)
they did not assist the other spouse to defeat collection via asset
transfers, (2) they timely elect relief, and (3) they did not have actual
knowledge of the understatement. 26

259. I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1). The fourth factor largely reduces to whether the spouse claiming relief
derived substantial material benefit from the tax underpayment.
(2002).
260. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)-(4).

See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-2(d)
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Although these categories are loose in some respects, they are
precision itself compared to the third category. If they fail to meet the
requirements of both § 6015(b) and § 6015(c), taxpayers may still qualify
for relief under § 6015(f) if "taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for [the
tax] .,261

First by revenue procedure2 62 then by regulations,263 the IRS and
Treasury have sought to give content to this category, mostly by
reference to factors familiar under § 6015(b) and 6015(c). 264 Thus a
number of positive factors will, if present, influence the IRS towards
granting § 6015(f) relief,265 and their absence or the presence of a
of negative factors will influence the IRS towards denying the
number
266
relief.

However, the factors may not be exclusive; their weighting is not
fixed; and the § 6015 decision is made on the basis of all facts and
circumstances taken as a whole. 67 Moreover, the IRS's determination
need not end the controversy. The courts have asserted, and the IRS has
a right to review IRS decisions not to grant § 6015(f)
acknowledged, 268
equitable relief.

CDP: Before the IRS may levy on property, it must inform the
taxpayer of her right to a hearing with the Appeals Office. 269 Generally
similar procedures are required within five days after the IRS files notice
of tax lien. 270 At the hearing, the Appeals Officer must verify that the
IRS has followed prescribed procedures to that point.271 At the hearing,
the taxpayer may raise "any relevant issue," including "(i) spousal
defenses, (ii) challenges to the appropriateness of collection action, and
261. I.R.C. § 6015(f)(1).
262. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447.
263. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6015-1.6015-9, 1.6013-4 (as amended by T.D. 9003, 2002-32 I.R.B. 294);
67 Fed. Reg. 47278 (July 18, 2002), correctedby, 67 Fed. Reg. 54735 (Aug. 26, 2002).
264. See generally Gary Fleischman & Sean Valentine, How to Improve Equitable Relief for
Innocent Spouses, 96 TAx NOTES 874, 874 (2002).
265. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, § 4.03(1), 2000-1 C.B. 448-49. These factors involve marital status,
economic hardship, abuse, level of knowledge, legal obligations under divorce decree, and
attributability of the items to the other spouse.
266. Id. § 4.03(2). The negative factors include attributability of the items to the requesting
spouse, significant benefit to the requesting spouse, noncompliance with the law, and legal
obligation under divorce decree.
267. Id. § 4.03(2)(b); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-4(a) (2002).
268. E.g., Beck v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 347 (2001), acq. in result, 2001-51 I.R.B.
584 (Dec. 17, 2001).
269. I.R.C. § 6330(a)(1).
270. I.R.C. § 6320(a), (c).
271. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1).

2003]

TAX COMPLIANCE

1057

(iii) offers of collection alternatives. 272 The taxpayer may also contest
his liability for the underlying tax if he did not have opportunity to do so
previously. 273 The taxpayer may seek judicial review if the Appeals
Officer upholds the collection action.274
In addition, under I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(c), appeals must consider
"whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the
efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the [taxpayer]
that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary., 275 That
has been interpreted to mean that the Appeals Officer must balance the
IRS's needs against concerns-such as hardship, intrusiveness, and
perhaps other factors-that the taxpayer may interpose against
collection. Further, the courts may review Appeal's determination on
this matter.27 6 The IRS and Treasury have issued final regulations as to
the CDP rules,277 but they do not notably guide Appeals in effecting such
balancing. 278
OIC: For decades, there have been two recognized grounds on which
offers in compromise could be made: doubt as whether the taxpayer
actually was liable for the tax and doubt as to whether the liability could
be collected from the taxpayer's present and foreseeable assets and
income. 279 Of these, the second was and remains far the more important,
and the IRS had promulgated standards for its determination.28 °
RRA '98 required the IRS to develop revised guidelines as to when
offers are adequate. 28' The legislative history stated that Congress
wanted factors such as "equity, hardship,
2 2 and public policy" to be
considered in the offer evaluation process.
This was generally taken as
a mandate to create a new, third category of OIC relief, which has come
to be known as "hardship" or "effective tax administration" relief. The
IRS and the Treasury incorporated this new category into final
272. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A).
273. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).
274. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1).
275. I.R.C. §§§ 6330(c)(3)(C).
276. E.g., Compucel Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 2002-1 USTC P 50,284 (D. Md. 2002);
Kitchen Cabinets, Inc. v. United States, 2001-1 USTC P 50,287 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
277. Treas. Reg. § 301.63201-1 (as amended by T.D. 8979, 2002-6 I.R.B. 466); 67 Fed. Reg.
2558 (Jan. 18, 2002); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1 (as amended by T.D. 8980, 2002-6 I.R.B. 477); 67
Fed. Reg. 2549 (Jan. 18, 2002).
278. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(e)(3) (A-El (vi)) (stating that collection actions should be
"no more intrusive than necessary."), 301.6330-1(e)(3) (A-El) (vi) (same).
279. See LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supranote 25, at 628.
280. See I.R.M. (CCH) 5.8.5.3 (Nov. 1, 2002).
281. I.R.C. § 7122(c).
282. H.R. 599, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted).
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of factors for
regulations in 2002,283 which set out a non-exclusive 2list
84
use in determining eligibility for this category of relief.
Thus, a residual, catch-all, equity basis for relief exists in all three
regimes. In spousal relief, it is § 6015 equitable relief. In CDP, it is
balancing of hardship. In OIC, it is the hardship or effective tax
administration avenue. These bases are undesirable and should be
eliminated. I say this for three reasons, of which the third is central to
this Article. First, at their best, such bases are unnecessary. The most
comprehensive of the factors set out under the three are under § 6015(f).
Most of the identified factors repeat concepts from § 6015(b) and (c). To
the extent that § 6015(f) provides little more than those two categories, it
is unnecessary.
Second, the bases are unpredictable and create risk that taxpayers
will be treated inconsistently. As seen, the spousal relief and OIC factors
provide for no particular weighting of factors and, ultimately, are openended. Balancing under the CDP rules always is an "eye of the
beholder" sort of enterprise.
Equitable relief under § 6015(f) has been a "guessing game. '2 85 The
other two residual categories are little better. Multi-factorial, unweighted
balancing tests are notorious for their unpredictability. 286 We have that
evil here. Horizontal equity-the principle that similarly situated
taxpayers should be treated similarly-has long been recognized 287 as a
goal. It is a key value in our tax system. 288 The indeterminacy of the
spousal relief, OIC, and CDP equity bases puts that value at risk.
Third, as central to this Article, consider the resource effects of the
three bases. It is standard procedure for a taxpayer to throw in a §
6015(f) count if making a spousal relief claim on either other ground, to
283. See supra note 168. Economic hardship is defined by reference to Regulation § 301.63431. See generally Amy Hamilton, IRS to Refine OIC Equity Factors-Possiblyin New Regs, 97 TAX
NoTEs 578, 626 (2002) (stating that a team will be appointed to define "hardship" which term
originated from T.D. 9007).
284. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(3) (codified at 26 C.F.R. part 301).
285. Fleischman & Valentine, supra note 264, at 876; see August v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH)
183 (2002) (holding that the IRS abused its discretion in denying § 6015(f) relief and weighing the
equities differently, and not every independent reader will agree with the court's conclusion).
286. See, e.g., Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364, 367-68 (3d Cir. 1977);
Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1976). This is why the nine
factors of Reg. § 1.183-2 have left many hobby loss cases essentially toss-ups.
287. E.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979); Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591, 599 (1948); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
288. See, e.g., Rosina B. Barker & Jasper L. Cummings, Interview with C. Eugene Steuerle,
1995 ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWSL., 11 (Summer) (discussing how horizontal equity "drives policy
more than any other [principle]" and "drives most policy debates").
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throw in an effective tax administration count if making an OIC, and to
argue balancing of interests in a CDP hearing. The evaluation of those
extra issues adds time, certainly administratively and perhaps also
judicially if appeal occurs. It is impossible to quantify that time, but it
likely is appreciable. These extra issues occur in tens of thousands of
administrative cases each year. It does not take long per case for the
total to mount.
Congress made a judgment in including the residual, equitable
categories in the three regimes in RRA '98. It knew it wanted to create
or expand relief; it thought it had done so through the more directed
relief bases it crafted; but it was not sure its nets had caught each case.
The residual, equitable categories were created to get those last few
possible cases. That is the way the sections have played out. As far as
available information indicates, there have been relatively few cases in
which relief was denied on other grounds but granted on the residual,
equitable grounds.289
Congress made the wrong choice in creating these grounds. It forgot
that costs as well as benefits must be considered. As said, the benefits
were expected to be and apparently have been, for the rare cases. In
securing those rare benefits, there were costs in many more cases:
expended administrative resources that could have been applied to much
greater effect elsewhere in the tax system. In short, the game was not
worth the candle. At a time when the IRS is otherwise squeezed for
resources, it is unwise, on balance, to expend its available resources on
these residual, equitable categories.
4. Remove Categories from OIC Eligibility
A way to somewhat moderate the torrent of OIC cases would be to
declare some types of liabilities categorically ineligible for compromise.
A category would be a candidate for such ineligibility if it possessed both
of two characteristics: (1) on the merits, this is not a type of liability or
taxpayer we should wish to help and (2) identifying when particular
cases fall into the category is sufficiently easy that the identification
would not consume more time than the exclusion would save.

289. Among the cases discussing I.R.C. § 6015(f) relief, see Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. C1.
49 (2001); August v, Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (2002).
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I can offer one category now that meets both criteria. Tax liabilities
attributable to fraud should not be eligible for relief; offers to
compromise such liabilities should be summarily rejected.
Liabilities attributable to fraud meet the first criterion. The Code
recognizes that fraud is special, and it treats it more harshly than it treats
mere mistake or negligence.29 ° Similarly, Congress should declare that
taxpayers who commit fraud do not deserve OIC relief. First, allowing
fraud liabilities to be compromised reduces the "sting" and so the
disincentive to commit fraud. Second, the knowledge that taxpayers
committing fraud can have parts (perhaps large parts) of their liabilities
written off, is likely to erode the confidence of the honest taxpayers in
our system. The best analogy is to the Bankruptcy Code. Liabilities
291
attributable to fraud are not dischargeable in the bankruptcy process.
OIC-which often is viewed as an alternative to bankruptcy-should
treat such liabilities no more indulgently.
Liabilities attributable to fraud also meet the second criterion. The
officer processing the offer can easily determine from the file, or even a
detailed transcript, whether a fraud penalty has been assessed against the
taxpayer. If so, end of story. Easy. Fast.
Adoption of this change would eliminate the time spent in processing
and considering OIC claims as to fraud liabilities. That would be a start.
Thought should be given to other candidate categories for ineligibility.
One might be liabilities based on frivolous, protestor-type arguments. A
barrier might be the ill-advised RRA '98 rule prohibiting the IRS from
using "protestor" designations.29 2 We should abolish that barrier and
investigate whether ready indicators of this condition do or can exist in
files so that this category can be added to the catalog of OIC ineligibility.
5. Eliminate CDP Hearings on Frivolous Claims
Too often, it has been not honest taxpayers harassed by the system
but taxpayers who harass the system who have invoked the rules and
protections of RRA '98. These rules sometimes have been another lever
pulled by taxpayers bent not on fair resolution but obstruction and delay.
290.

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1) (abolishing statute of limitations on assessment in cases of

fraud); I.R.C. § 6651(f) (raising maximum delinquency penalty from 25% to, in cases of fraud, 75%
of underpayment); I.R.C. § 6663(a) (imposing 75% penalty on deficiencies with respect to
fraudulent returns).
291. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(c) (2000). For useful discussion of this rule in the context of tax
claims in bankruptcy, see In re Fretz, 244 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2001).
292. RRA 1998, supra note 2, at § 307.
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In particular, many requests for CDP relief have been filed asserting only
frivolous, often rejected, or protestor-type arguments.
An IRS Appeals Office took the view that taxpayers filing requests
raising only such arguments need not be granted face-to-face hearings.
However, the IRS National Office 293 and the courts 294 took a different
view, requiring that a hearing be held. 95 Once at the hearing, if the
Appeals Officer determines that the taxpayer has nothing but frivolous
arguments, he may end the hearing,
but the hearing must be
commenced.
The theory appears to be that there may in fact be a real issue in the
case even though it is not disclosed by a hearing request raising only
frivolous arguments. But again, the reasoning is flawed by the failure to
recognize the costs imposed. There may be a good issue in there
somewhere (but probably not). But there will be valuable administrative
resources consumed in every case where the hearing is held. The
certainty of the resources cost should outweigh the relatively small
possibility of a wrong requiring redress.
The Montijo case 297 illustrates the present regime. The IRS had
assessed a frivolous return penalty under § 6702 against the taxpayer.
The taxpayer's CDP hearing request asserted only protestor arguments
(of the type that resulted in the penalty in the first place). The local
Appeals Office granted the protestor only a telephone hearing, on the
basis of which that office upheld the penalty. On appeal, the district
court required the Appeals Office to hold a face-to-face hearing.
Appeals then jumped through that hoop. Unsurprisingly, Appeals
affirmed the penalty again after the face-to-face hearing. On a new
appeal, the district court easily agreed with Appeals' conclusion
holding
298
that there was "no doubt about the validity of the penalty.,
Only someone slavishly attached to ritual over practicality could feel
proud of a system that produced a farce like that in Montijo. What a
293. See I.R.S. Service Center Advisory 2002-33-001, 2002 WL 1883647 (Aug. 16, 2002);
I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advisory 2001-23-060,2001 WL634371 (Mar. 23,2001).
294. Montijo v. United States, 2002 WL 507573 (D. Nev. 2002), modifying 2002 WL 1466096
(D. Nev. 2002).
295. A seriously divided Tax Court held that face-to-face hearings are not required in all
circumstances. Lunsford v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 183, 190-204 (2001).
296. E.g., Tipp v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 759 (2001); Inman v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH)
1583 (2001).
297. See supra note 293.
298. Montijo v. United States, 2002 WL 1466096, * 3 (D. Nev. 2002). A substantially similar
case with similar waste of administrative and judicial resources is Ahee v. United States, 2002 WL
1023165 (D. Nev. 2001), amended by Ahee v. United States, 2002 WL 31061637 (D. Nev. 2002).
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waste of both administrative and judicial resources. We should abolish
the need for a CDP hearing when the taxpayer's request raises only tired,
universally rejected, frivolous arguments.
Indeed, in 2002 Congress had before it legislation (supported by the
administration) to do that. The legislation failed but apparently for
reasons unrelated to the merits of this proposal. 299 The Administration
repurposed the measure in its FY 2004 budget proposals, 3°° and the idea
remains a good one. This change would free resources for more
profitable use at little or no cost to any genuine protection of honest and
compliant taxpayers. As former Commissioner Rossotti testified to
Congress last year:
Some individuals are using the [CDP] hearing process to delay collection
action by filing requests that rise frivolous issues ....
IRS Appeals has
approximately 20,000 CDP cases in inventory. About four percent, or 800
cases, involve frivolous issues taxpayers.... However, the numbers alone do
not account for the inordinate amount of time it takes for such cases. Frivolous
claims occupy a disproportionate share of time over claims from taxpayers
having substantive issues. Frivolous issue taxpayers frequently file voluminous
claims. Just reading these to ensure any valid issues presented is extremely
time-consuming. A larger percentage of the frivolous issue taxpayers go to
court where they raise the same frivolous issues. Also, some of the individuals
file Sec. 1203 actions (mandatory employee termination violations) against IRS
employees, which are very time-consuming, even when they are not
30
sustained.

V.

1

CONCLUSION

An indispensable ingredient for improved American tax compliance
is more resources for the IRS. Congress has imposed heavy and diverse
responsibilities on the IRS, but it has failed and will continue to fail to
provide the agency the budgetary support that would allow it to perform
these responsibilities.
299. H.R. 5728, 107th Cong. § 307(b) (2002). The bill also would have amended the section
6702 penalty as to frivolous submissions. Id. at § 307(c). See Amy Hamilton, Fiscal 2003 Budget:
Bush Wants to Modify IRS Reform Act, 94 TAX NOTES 665, 665 (2002) (discussing Bush's
proposal). The proposal would have permitted the IRS to dismiss requests for CDP hearings,
installment agreements, offers in compromise, and taxpayer assistance orders if they were based on

frivolous arguments or were intended to impede tax administration.
300. See Robert F. Manning & David F. Windish, A Concise Explanation of the Administration's
Tax Proposal,98 TAX NOTES 902, 914 (2003) (discussing the "economic growth portion" of Bush's
2004 revenue proposal).
301. ProgressReport on the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, HearingsBefore the
Joint Economic Committee, 107th Cong. 2d. Sess (2002) (Statement of Charles 0. Rossotti).
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Thus, at least part of the needed resources will have to come from
simplifications of the tax law. Piecemeal simplification is the route most
likely to be feasible. This Article has suggested five simplifications to
rules created or amended by RRA '98. Certainly, they would not close
all of the resources gap, even were all five adopted. However, they
would liberate a meaningful amount of resources, whose redeployment to
taxpayer assistance, enforcement, or both would assist in improving tax
administration and tax compliance in the United States.

